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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Politics During and After Democratic Backsliding
by
Benjamin R. Schneider
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2022
Professor Randall Calvert, Chair
Why do voters support backsliding incumbents? Under what conditions are voters more
permissive to backsliding? In recent years, scholars have been interested in what leads to
voters to support backsliding incumbents where we should expect them to be sanctioned and
generally these answers have been focused on partisanship and polarization. I build on this
literature by arguing that societal threat reduces the negative evaluation of backsliding actions
and highlights the need for competent leaders to protect against future crisis. I develop
an original formal model that considers the different strategies available to backsliding
incumbents and shows that societal threat benefits backsliders most when they have a
competence advantage. Otherwise, societal threat can work against them, and given the
ability to increase societal threat salience, they will not do so. I empirically verify a conclusion
of the model that higher societal threat leads to more democratic backsliding for some types
of threat. This research has implications for the persistence of backsliding incumbents and
the prospects of removal.
What does the opposition do after democratic backsliding? Much of the backsliding
literature has been focused on the rise and persistence of backsliding governments, but
less focus has been placed on what happens after these governments leave power. The
democratization literature has some helpful expectations for successor behavior, but a newer
ix

framework is needed because backsliding countries are different from autocracies. I use an
original formal model to rigorously explore when a successor to an initial backslider either
prioritizes restoring democratic institutions and norms, or uses weakened institutions to
pursue policy priorities and maintain power. I show that three main factors drive this decision:
the durability of restorative measures, the magnitude of the subverted institutions, and the
electoral safety of a successor. When restorative measures are not durable, a successor never
benefits from restoring institutions. When restoration is durable, more severely subverted
institutions make maintaining backsliding less appealing to a successor. Electoral safety
impacts different kinds of backsliding differently: restoring executive constraints is less
advantageous as electoral safety rises, but the reverse is true for restoring free and fair
elections. This study provides an understanding of both the choices of successors and the
prospects for long term democratic resurgence after a single instance of backsliding.
How does backsliding affect voters’ preference for democratic institutions? Most of the
literature on voters’ acquiescence to backsliding focuses on the initial infraction and electoral
efforts of backsliding incumbents, but less is known about how the preferences among those
who did not support the incumbent are affected. I consider how the severity of backsliding
enacted by an incumbent of the opposite party affects voters’ preferences for or against
backsliding when deployed by their own party. I posit that voters consider the trade-off
between backsliding from their preferred leaders and the policies enacted. When voters are
more focused on policy, especially after more extreme backsliding actions, they are more likely
to support their leaders retaliating against the initial backslider. This makes restoration
unlikely because of incentives that produce a cycle of retaliation which can set the stage for
democratic failure. I evaluate the theory using an original survey experiment in the United
States, a country that has recently replaced a backsliding incumbent. I found that respondents
were more likely to prefer a retaliating candidate when the previous administration enacted

x

more extreme backsliding. Expectations with respect to partisanship were not supported by
the survey experiment. This study has implications for the prospects of either democratic
resurgence or democratic failure in post-backsliding states.
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Chapter 1
Democratic Backsliding and Why it
Matters

1.1

Introduction

Democratic backsliding is a collection of actions that weaken democratic institutions in
order to benefit a leader’s political or personal goals (Bermeo 2016; Mechkova, Lührmann,
and Lindberg 2017; Schedler 2010; Waldner and Lust 2018). Backsliding actions directly
compromise a state’s democracy by attacking institutional safeguards meant to limit the
power of branches of government or by making it more difficult for voters to select the
government. These attacks have severe ramifications for the future of a democratic state
as they work to damage institutions and limit democratic participation (Waldner and Lust
2018). These actions are typically gradual and develop slowly throughout the tenure of on
authoritarian-minded leader (e.g., Erdoğan’s Turkey, Orbán’s Hungary, Duda’s Poland) who
is usually the head of state, and aided by a strong party in the legislature (Driesen 2021).
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These gradual declines in democratic quality contrast with quick and dramatic seizures of
power by leaders, referred to as a self-coup or autogolpe (e.g., Fujimori’s Peru), or by the
military that used to be the major avenue of democratic collapse (Huq and Ginsburg 2018;
Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
Backsliding events have become more common in the past couple of decades (Lührmann
and Lindberg 2019). Cases range from more established backsliding regimes in Hungary,
Poland, Turkey, and Venezuela to newer governments with early backsliding such as Brazil and
the recently removed, but still relevant, Trump administration in the United States. Other
cases like India, Israel and Mexico have also had more recent turns away from democracy that
have received less attention. Beyond these cases, dozens more have experienced some level
of democratic decline in recent years. Among the most recent cases, in Tunisia, President
Kais Saied put forward a new constitution for referendum on July 25th of 2022 that was
overwhelmingly approved by voters (Sands and Murphy 2022). This new constitution helps
Saied concentrate powers of the presidency and allows him to declare emergencies in order to
dissolve parliament and extend his term in office (Parker 2022). The number and severity of
these cases makes the study of democratic backsliding increasingly noteworthy.
In this project, I focus on two stages of democratic backsliding: during and after.
Considerable excellent work has been devoted to the precursors of backsliding and the ascent
of would-be backsliders, so the “before” will not receive as much attention. In Chapter 2, I
consider how voters’ opinions of a backsliding incumbent develop and under what conditions
they prefer to retain or replace the incumbent. I focus my answer for this question in terms
of societal threat and how it can help backsliding incumbents justify their backsliding actions
to voters by inducing voter support for a competent leader. I use both a formal model to
explore this mechanism and empirical application to explore a key conclusion from my model:
higher societal threat allows for additional democratic backsliding.
2

In Chapters 3 and 4, I explore what we should expect when backsliders are removed. This
is a frontier of the literature due to the small number of cases, but is crucial to understand
since democratic backsliding is a multi-step process and those steps do not have to occur
under one backslider or even one party. In Chapter 3, I rigorously explore the preferences of
the successors to initial backsliders through a formal model and outline three key factors that
drive the decision to restore institutions or maintain subverted institutions: the durability
of restorative measures, electoral safety, and the magnitude of the subverted institutions.
In Chapter 4, I focus on voters and under what conditions they are more or less likely to
support further backsliding. I evaluate this through a survey experiment in the United
States, where a backslider has been recently removed from office. I specifically expect that
former out-party voters prefer a more aggressive retaliatory candidate the more severe the
backsliding perpetrated by the incumbent.
Ultimately, this work helps push the study of backsliding forward in two key ways.
The first is by providing an additional factor that determine whether a voter chooses to
retain a backsliding incumbent — societal threat — and how this is moderated through
already established considerations of partisanship, polarization, and leader competence. The
second is pushing forward the understanding of retaliatory backsliding actions and when the
alternation of parties can provide a balm or an irritant to the democratic health of a country.
By rigorously exploring the incentives of successors through formal theoretical work, and
the preferences of voters through experimental work, I provide initial expectations for this
frontier in the backsliding literature. In the rest of this chapter, I first detail the existing
work on democratic backsliding. Then, I use observational data to detail the number of
recent cases of backsliding and the prospects for democracy after those infractions. Lastly, I
distinguish the backsliding actions I am specifically evaluating that will feature throughout
the remainder of the dissertation.
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1.2

Democratic Backsliding Background

The trend of the recent decline in democratic quality in countries throughout the world has
gone by several names: democratic recession (Diamond 2015), democratic deconsolidation
(Foa and Mounk 2017b), constitutional retrogression (Huq and Ginsburg 2018), constitutional
rot (Balkin 2017), and the term used in this inquiry — democratic backsliding (Bermeo
2016). Regardless of the term used and the exact definition prescribed, the general picture is
the same, that several constitutional democracies throughout the world have experienced
recent movements away from democracy. With respect to the “waves” of democratization1
discerned by Huntington (1991), this new movement concluded the post Cold-War third
wave of democratization and has ushered in a new period of authoritarian reversion (Chu
et al. 2020; Foa and Mounk 2017a; Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Lührmann and Lindberg
2019). This literature is relatively new and heavily theoretical, but builds on a historical
understanding of movement to and from democracy. This newer phenomenon has some
distinguishing characteristics from past democratic reversion, and a wealth of new empirical
applications and measures that have pushed the study of democracy further than previously
possible. In this section, I introduce the wider literature by discussing how democratic
backsliding has been measured and theorized.
1

Generally these are divided into three waves of democratization and three waves of reversion (two plus
this most recent trend of backsliding). The first wave of democratization or the “long wave” began in the
1820’s and died off as the first reversion began in the 1920s. This first reversion (1922-1945) peaked during
World War II and after which lead to the second wave of democratization from 1945 to 1960. After, a second
reversion occurred from 1960 to 1975. The most recent “third wave”, which was the result of the decline
of the Soviet Union and other democratic movements world wide began as the second reversion concluded.
When Huntington wrote about this wave, he theorized that a third reversion may eventually come, and since
then, scholars generally view the rise of democratic backsliding starting in 1998 in Venezuela up until today
has marked this third reversion (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). See section 1.3 for a chart mapping these
three cycles using measures of democratic quality.
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1.2.1

Measurement

The most recent wave of democratic backsliding began sometime between the late 1990s and
mid 2000s. Ever since this time, on average, several indicators of democratic quality like
Freedom House and the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) have shown, on average, a
consistent degradation of democratic performance. Backsliding is defined as a degradation of
the qualities of democratic governance through a series of incremental actions (Waldner and
Lust 2018). This is distinct from the more prevalent military coups or other dramatic seizures
of power that used to be much more common (Svolik 2018). The less dramatic, progressively
deteriorating actions that are emblematic of democratic backsliding are more subtle, and
sometimes are so gradual, that voters sometimes fail to recognize any wrongdoing (Bermeo
2016).
Democratic backsliding is a somewhat opaque concept, and consequently, it is difficult
to measure these changes in a uniform way across time and space. Changes in measures of
regime type and quality are typically used, but because backsliding is a gradual process, an
effective measurement that can adequately capture changes is difficult to derive and even
more difficult to be agreed upon. It is for this reason that a considerable amount of work on
democratic backsliding is either theoretical, formal theoretical, or qualitative. Empirical work
tends to focus on single-country studies or a selection of geographically close countries (like
western Europe or Latin America). It is for this reason that uniform cross-national theories
of democratization and democratic backsliding rarely receive universal support. That said,
as measures improve, the ability to quantify the changes in democratic quality will open up
the literature of democratic backsliding to new empirical applications.
Generally, a backsliding action or event requires degradation in two of three characteristics:
competition, participation, and accountability (Waldner and Lust 2018). Several indicators
5

of regime quality are commonly used to measure these changes, but they vary considerably
in their sensitivity to change. Freedom House (Repucci and Slipowitz 2022), Polity IV
(Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017), and V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020) are three of the
major cooperative projects that measure regime quality and the changes in these measures
are commonly used to assess backsliding. Other measures from Skaaning, Gerring, and
Bartusevičius (2015) and Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013), which aggregate Freedom
House and Polity IV, have similarly measured these concepts. Ultimately, the lack of a single
gold standard indicator makes using a variety of measures attractive to assess several factors
that describe democratic backsliding as the best approach. In Chapter 2, I rely on three
“high-level” indices from V-Dem each of which aggregates several fine-grained measures to
assess institutional change that can capture democratic backsliding. I detail these measures
further in section 1.3 where I demonstrate the prevalence of backsliding events in since 1990.

1.2.2

Precursors

As democratic backsliding is a difficult concept to effectively pin down, a considerable amount
of work has been undertaken in recent years to better explain the phenomenon. While I focus
on two specific instances within this literature — the choice of voters to remove a backsliding
incumbent, and the preferences of out-party voters and successors to initial backsliders when
they return to power — there is a wide array of other work that I do not contribute to, but
is foundational. This dissertation primarily focuses on the “during” and “after” phases of
democratic backsliding, but the precursors to backsliding are important in shaping the path
of what comes during and after. This work does not heavily feature in the remainder of this
project, but certain concepts are influential when considering a backslider’s tenure and what
occurs after their removal, and I note when this is the case. I divide the precursors into four
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groups: leader-driven explanations, voter-driven explanations, institutional explanations, and
other explanations.
With respect to the leader-driven work, this literature is focused on the political actors
that are backsliding-minded office-seekers and when they can rise to power. Political actors
are a significant driving force for whether backsliding measures are enacted or not. Studies
of Latin America showed that the prevalence of moderate leaders has been a key factor
in staving off backsliding (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a). After the election of a
more extreme leader, like Brazilian President Jair Bolsanaro in 2018, this dynamic may be
challenged because a backsliding-minded leader can take advantage of a “superpresidential”
system (Lapper 2021). Further, the increase in the frequency of political outsiders entering
office as (mostly right-wing) populists is important as backsliding is a leader-driven process.
Ultimately, the presence of a mostly non-democratic, disloyal opposition that accedes to
power is a significant factor in traditional democratic collapse (Linz and Stepan 1978). While
these historical dramatic seizures via coups have given way to gradual backsliding actions,
the rise of group hostile to democracy is crucial to both the beginning of backsliding and its
persistence. Factors such as partisanship, polarization, and societal threat also help drive
voter preferences (the demand-side) and enables an increase of the authoritarian-minded
politicians who become backsliders.
While leader-driven explanations are attractive, authoritarian-minded politicians do not
enter office on their own. The role of voters responding to changing societies, especially in
response to factors that I classify as societal threat2 , has been connected with the rise of
populist politicians, especially those from the far-right (Baccini and Sattler 2021; BallardRosa et al. 2021; Bustikova 2014; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Inglehart and Norris 2017;
Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). Populists tend to care less about constitutional norms that
2

See Chapter 2 for more.
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make democratic persistence possible (Issacharoff 2018) and when these preferences are mixed
with cultural grievances like rising immigration (Aleinikoff 2018), as is commonly the case
with right-wing populism, the movement to disenfranchise the voices of ethnic minorities
rises (King and Smith 2018). Backsliding actions that work to disenfranchise are a key focus
of this project, and I discuss this group of strategies further in section 1.4. Increased voter
dissatisfaction with the party system is an important factor that helps populists gain power.
Populists gained power due to rising anti-system sentiments from the right in Hungary and
from the left in Venezuela (Scheppele 2018; Tushnet 2018).
A key area where the leader-driven and voter-driven explanations work in tandem is with
the role of partisanship and polarization. These concepts are influential because when voters
are most concerned with policy, they are willing to overlook democratic subversion when it is
leveraged in service of their preferred outcomes (Balkin 2017; Nalepa, Vanberg, and Chiopris
2018; Graham and Svolik 2020; Grillo and Prato 2020; Braley et al. 2021; Svolik 2018, 2019).
The presence and growth of anti-system parties or factions is a historical component of
the literature (Linz and Stepan 1978), so the growth of “populist” parties, adversarial to
democracy, is an important explanation for both the onset of democratic backsliding and the
continuation in office of backsliders. Partisanship and polarization are also important factors
in the persistence of democracy and will be featured in each chapter.
Theories of a country’s vulnerability to democratic decline based on institutional alignments are a traditional focus in study of democratic backsliding. Most of this literature
is based on the literature around horizontal and vertical accountability (O’Donnell 1998;
Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000). Theoretical work has focused on preferences for some
institution or coalition configurations: a focus on using grand-coalitions to forestall democratic decline by making the persistence of democracy a shared fate (Lijphart 1977), better
performance of proportional representation which avoid malapportionment of representatives
8

over majoritarian representation (Reynolds 2010), and better performance of parliamentary
systems which diffuse power from a single individual over presidentialism (Linz 1990; Maeda
2010). The endogeneity of these institutional configurations remains a significant concern
in this literature though, because the same factors that determine the institutions in a
country also impact democratic performance and quality (Cheibub et al. 2007; Mainwaring
and Shugart 1997). For example, the proliferation of presidential systems in Latin America
is also a direct result of factors that impact persistence of democracy, like the history of
military dictatorships and executive hegemony (Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, and Vairo 2019).
Lastly, work on specific institutions and their role in staving off democratic backsliding,
namely an independent judiciary, are also featured in the backsliding literature (Gibler and
Randazzo 2011; Kelemen and Blauberger 2017). Ultimately, institutional explanations are
some of the most hotly debated theories and this has driven the greater focus on formal
theoretic work and single-country studies in recent years.
Finally, there are some other factors that are commonly cited in the literature, but do
not fit cleanly into the categories above. Many of these explanations focus on economic
factors and have mixed results (Bermeo 2009; Boix 2010; Haggard and Kaufman 2012, 2016;
Sitaraman 2018; Slater, Smith, and Nair 2014). The rise of inequality has been cited as
factor that contributes to the rise of populism, but the robustness of effect is up for debate
(Waldner and Lust 2018). Other work has highlighted the work of crisis and how temporary
powers become more permanent (Driesen 2021; Gross 2018). Crisis and its relationship to
societal threat is central to the theory of Chapter 2 where voters’ fear of crisis is a key feature
in the persistence of backsliding. Finally, returning to the waves of democratization and
reversion, Huntington (1991) outlined factors that preceded the past two global reversions
to authoritarianism and some of these factors are relevant today. Weakness of democratic
values amongst elites and general public, economic setbacks that intensified social conflict,
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social and political polarization, and movements to exclude political groups were among the
precursors that remain salient today.
Ultimately, I am contributing to two select areas within the literature, described in more
depth in the subsequent chapters: a voter’s choice to retain or replace a backslider, and the
preferences of former out-party voters and leaders after a backslider is removed. In each of
these instances there is room for theoretical innovation and targeted inquiry to assess the key
factors that affect backsliding and its persistence.

1.3

How Prevalent is Democratic Backsliding?

As discussed, precisely measuring democratic backsliding is a significant challenge, but I rely
on measures from V-Dem to measure change at the year level (Coppedge et al. 2020). I
use three different indicators of democratic quality. The first is a measure of basic electoral
democracy in line with Dahl (1971) polyarchy to assess the extent of suffrage and whether
elections are free and fair. The second is a rigorous measure of participatory democracy to
serve as a high bar for voter access to elections. Last, is a measure for liberal democracy
which helps assess the roles of constraints within and on government. These three measures
help illustrate changes in quality of different institutions that are impacted when backsliding
takes place. In table 2.2 of Chapter 2, I further elaborate on the measures I use for the
empirical application.
To better display these measures in context of the waves of democratization and reversion
(Huntington 1991), I show both the average score of each measure across all countries in the
sample in each year since 1900 and also the average change from the previous year in figure
1.1. This figure helps illustrate the waves of democratization and the waves of democratic
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Figure 1.1: Average Yearly Democracy Scores and Average Year-Change.
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reversion including the most recent trend of democratic backsliding3 . While the measures
are heavily correlated on average, there is some useful variation at the year level that makes
using all three attractive to assess change in democratic quality.
In order to explore recent democratic backsliding, I use this data to identify the number
of cases of backsliding since 1990. This helps capture the most recent wave away from
democracy (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). I aggregate the country-year data from V-Dem
to the country-government level to assess how democratic institutions changed during the
tenure of an incumbent between elections. For the governments that met a baseline electoral
democracy score greater than 0.5 (around the average score throughout this time period), I
isolated those that had either a small or large decline in one of the three democracy indices
from V-Dem. Of these observations, I distinguish between governments that were retained or
3

The exact years of these waves is up for debate. Also, while considerable regional variation exists within
each of these time periods, this overarching trend is helpful for detailing how democratic quality has changed
over time. For a more fine-grained treatment of democratic waves, see Gunitsky (2018).
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replaced at the end of the electoral term. Electoral retention and replacement of backsliders
is a key focus of each of the three substantive chapters and the prospect of democratic
improvement after replacement are of significant focus in Chapters 3 and 4.
If a backslider is replaced by a successor, there are two options that I propose the successor
can choose between: retaliation or restoration. Under retaliation, the successor uses weakened
institutions to pass preferred policies and maintain power with greater certainty. Alternatively,
the new government can prioritize restoration by repairing institutional constraints and norms,
but at the expense of fully enacting policy goals or retaining office with higher certainty. I
use the observational data to identify cases either when a backslider was retained and either
reformed or continued backsliding, or a backslider was replaced and the successor either
restored institutions or retaliated. I divided these changes into one of four categories: all
indices were worse after the election, the indices were mixed (some better, some worse), all
three improved, or the observation is the most recently elected government in the sample for
that country. In table 1.1, I show the number of cases by each category and the percent of
the cases per column.
This demonstrates that when significant democratic backsliding is enacted, the retention
of the incumbent is much higher than when any small democratic deviation is recorded. This
gives some evidence that those who engage in backsliding are more likely to retain office, in
line with expectations that some backsliding actions allow backsliders to retain power with
greater certainty. Also, the prospects for democracy seem slightly better under a successor
government than when the incumbent retains office. A voter’s choice to retain or replace is the
focus of Chapter 2. The choice of the successor government to retaliate or restore institutions
is the focus on Chapter 3, and the preferences of out-party voters for their successors is the
focus of Chapter 4.
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Table 1.1: Prospects for Democracy After a Backslider Given Retention or Replacement.

All Worse After
Mixed Scores After
All Better After
Most Recent Obs.

Any decline in an indicator (426 Cases)
Incumbent Retained
Incumbent Replaced
248 Cases
178 Cases
(58.2% of Total Cases)
(41.8%)
95
56
(38.3% of Column)
(31.5%)
52
43
(21.0%)
(24.2%)
56
55
(22.6%)
(30.9%)
45
24
(18.1%)
(13.5%)

Severe decline in an indicator (78 Cases)
Incumbent Retained Incumbent Replaced
53 Cases
25 Cases
(67.9%)
(32.1%)
27
11
(51.0%)
(44.0%)
3
1
(5.7%)
(4.0%)
14
7
(26.4%)
(28.0%)
9
6
(17.0%)
(24.0%)

Note: Country-Government cases since 1990 (i.e., “Poland 2015-2020” as a single observation). I subset to
those with a Polyarchy score greater than 0.5 so each case was marginally considered democracies at the
beginning of the term in office. I identified both minor cases (any drop in one of the three indices) and major
cases (a drop of 0.05 or greater in one of the three indices). These are not mutually exclusive groups. Cells
show the number of country-government cases in that category and the percentage of that category per
column.

When looking at the decisions by successors to backsliders, the choice to restore institutions has some mixed examples. The governments preceding Bolsanaro’s rise in Brazil in 2018
and Orban’s rise in Hungary in 2010 showed considerable democratic decline, and the choice
of these known backsliders continued that pattern. Meanwhile, after backsliding actions
in the United States from 2016 to 2020, the successor government improved democratic
institutions. Many of the other instances of restoration after backsliding were in countries
that experienced dramatic democratic collapse, such as Estonia after 1992, Thailand after
2007, and Mali after 2013.
Among those that retained power, the further decline of democratic institutions occurred
in commonly cited cases like Venezuela from 1999 to 2005, Turkey from 2007 to 2015, and
Poland from 2015 to 2020. Cases where democracy improved after retention include Ecuador
after 2013, the Dominican Republic after 2016, and Romania after 2019. Retained incumbents
that continued to attack institutions over multiple terms in office receive the most attention
in the literature, but single term blips that are corrected are important as well. While I focus
on successors, understanding when backsliders restore institutions in a future term is another
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interesting avenue of research. As measurement of these concepts improves, it will be easier
to assess these changes both within country and cross-sectionally.
With these observations guiding the understanding of the number of backsliding events
since 1990, we can see that backsliding is a significant phenomenon both on average and with
respect to the number of cases. In the next section, I detail two specific kinds of backsliding
actions that I focus on throughout this project and provide examples of these backsliding
actions.

1.4

Varieties of Democratic Backsliding Actions

There are many different kinds of democratic backsliding, but for the purpose of this project
I focus on gradual backsliding strategies that attack democratic institutions. These gradual
actions help erode institutions in favor of an incumbent, but they are not the only kind of
actions scholars have identified as antagonistic to democracy. There is considerable literature
of the influx of religiosity in politics, especially in settings where secularism had been a
defining characteristic, such as Turkey (Varol 2014) and India (Mate 2018). Other actions
focus on limiting basic rights such as freedoms of speech and press, such as the case of Turkish
President Erdoğan’s strategy of suing and resultantly silencing journalists who criticize
him (Varol 2014). While these manifestations of backsliding are important, my focus on
institutional attacks is intended to highlight a set of actions with clear goals and results
either in terms of policy making or electoral performance.
There are two gradual kinds of backsliding that incumbents use: executive aggrandizement
and the strategic manipulation of elections (Bermeo 2009). The two approaches serve
authoritarian-minded incumbents jointly: first to make their preferred policies easier to enact
by eliminating challenges to these policies within government, and second to maintain power
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from election-to-election by attacking opposition candidates or limiting the voting rights of
supporters of the opposition. When democratic institutions are damaged, it can lead to lower
levels of freedom, higher inequality, worse government responsiveness, and lower governmental
accountability (Diamond and Morlino 2004). These strategies are rarely assessed in tandem,
though they are commonly used together by backsliding governments. I detail both sets of
strategies and state some expectations about why they should work differently in practice,
both with respect to values around democratic institutions and how their actual mechanical
differences are distinct.
In some existing models, backsliding events are modeled as increasing the likelihood that
voters will punish the incumbent because of executive overreach, but do not directly affect
electoral institutions (Graham and Svolik 2020; Grillo and Prato 2020; Nalepa, Vanberg,
and Chiopris 2018; Svolik 2018). I suggest that these models are addressing executive
aggrandizement, which Bermeo (2016) defines as, “when elected executives weaken checks on
executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the
power of opposition forces to challenge executive preference.” Executive aggrandizement is
a tool for incumbents to take over or to make existing institutions more favorable to their
goals. These backsliding measures are likely to concern voters who strongly value certain
democratic norms (e.g., role of the opposition in government, independence of the judiciary,
freedom of the press, etc.), but supporters may not be as concerned with these actions.
Incumbents implement executive aggrandizement when their ability to govern is constrained by other government actors (e.g., other branches of government, or the civil service)
and they want to act in defiance of these constraints. Attacks against institutions that can
limit the executive, such as the judiciary, are common examples of such backsliding (Gibler
and Randazzo 2011; Howell, Shepsle, and Wolton 2019). For example, in Poland, the ruling
PiS saw the Constitutional Tribunal as a major obstacle to implementing their preferred
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policies. The attack on the Constitutional Tribunal was accomplished by proactively packing
the court, appointing judges to fill existing seats and pushing existing adversarial judges out.
After the court was successfully captured, the PiS was able to leverage the now sympathetic
court in order to partake in further backsliding actions that could no longer be constrained
(Sadurski 2018).
Other work has modeled backsliding decisions as making re-election more certain for the
incumbent (Luo and Przeworski 2019). Bermeo (2016) calls these backsliding activities the
strategic manipulation of elections which:
“denote a range of actions aimed at tilting the electoral playing field in favor
of incumbents. . . including hampering media access, using government funds for
incumbent campaigns, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot, hampering
voter registration, packing electoral commissions, changing electoral rules to favor
incumbents, and harassing opponents — but all done in such a way that the
elections themselves do not appear fraudulent.”
Distinct from executive aggrandizement, the strategic manipulation of elections alters institutions to reduce the ability of citizens to remove an incumbent from power. This should be an
action that is more unnerving to voters because it directly constrains the most important
role they have in a democracy: voting for and against politicians. Incumbents likely use
these strategies when they are uncertain about either the likelihood of re-election or elections
relevant to their cause. However, these actions can serve to activate voters against them,
especially if voters are invested in democratic norms such as the freeness and fairness of elections. We should expect voters to have stronger negative reactions to strategic manipulation
of elections than executive aggrandizement for this reason.
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Incumbents strategically manipulate elections by attacking infrastructure and candidate
entry in elections. These actions help create an uneven playing field to limit the chances or
choices of the opposition while also refraining from engaging in outright fraud (Levitsky and
Way 2010). For example, the 1999 Constituent Assembly elections in Venezuela featured new
electoral institutions as a result of Chávez’s new constitution approved via referendum earlier
that year after failing to pass in the legislature. In the election, Chávez’s party won 121 of
the 131 seats with just under 66% of the vote (Landau 2018). This was made possible by
aggressively drawing districts to limit the voice of supporters of the opposition and prevent
equitable representation. Also consider the treatment of the Turkish political party, the HDP,
which primarily serves as a party for the Kurdish ethnic minority. The HDP has had several
leaders and members of the Grand National Assembly jailed on various charges including its
leader Selahattin Demirtaş after increasingly better performances against Erdoğan’s AKP.
The Turkish government spent the last few years trying to ban the party altogether (BBC
2021). These examples illustrate how the strategic manipulation of elections tilts the electoral
playing field and entrenches incumbents. I summarize the specific tools for both kinds of
backsliding in table 1.2 (Bermeo 2016; Schedler 2010).
While these two groups of strategies — executive aggrandizement and the strategic
manipulation of elections — often occur in tandem, they are distinct and serve different
goals: the first is to make governing easier so that incumbents can enact their agenda with
reduced difficulty, and the second is to ensure that they and their allies remain in office to
continue this practice. In order to better explore and explain voter support of backsliders, my
empirical models in Chapters 2 and 3 will consider both kinds of backsliding to first explore
the role of societal threat and how it affects the support of voters by justifying undesirable
backsliding actions, and then explore the choice of successors to initial backsliders. As stated,
we should not expect voters to view these two strategies with the same severity, and because
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Table 1.2: Two Kinds of Backsliding and Their Respective Tools (Bermeo 2016; Schedler
2010)
Backsliding Type

Tool

Executive
Aggrandizement
(weakening checks
from within
government)

Disempowerment
Agent Control
Fragmentation
Insulation

Strategic
Manipulation of
Elections
(weakening checks
outside government)

Market Restrictions
Preference Distortions
Vote Distortions

Definition
formally removing powers,
constraining exercise of powers
installing favorable actors,
create incentives for actors to not
challenge executive
divide an institution’s responsibilities,
keep institutions from acting with
a unified voice
limit an institution’s access to
external networks (esp courts)
opposition parties fragmented or
excluded, specific citizens excluded
voters prevented from expressing
true preferences
targeting laws before elections that
limit opposition parties

Example
Changing scope of the judiciary,
seizing legislating powers
Inserting loyalists on courts,
judiciary, etc. structure
incentives to maintain loyalty
Split a court into parts, splinter
the role of the legislature
Remove legal network from
courts
Ban parties, disenfranchisement
or suppression (targeted)
Voter Intimidation,
vote buying
Change rules for ballots that
disadvantage a specific group

their outcomes are different, a theoretical model should take that into consideration. In
Chapter 2, I allow voters to have two sets of democratic preferences for each set of backsliding
strategies for that reason.

1.5

Looking Forward

Democratic backsliding is an increasingly important area of study in political science, both
because of the rising prevalence of these events and the normative impact of weakened
democracy. This dissertation project contributes to the literature of democratic backsliding
in two key ways.
The first is to provide a greater understanding of the choice that voters make to retain
or replace their backsliding incumbent (Chapter 2). I propose that societal threat is an
additional important component that combines with past explanations of partisanship and
polarization to show why backsliding incumbents are so commonly retained. When voters feel
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threatened they are more likely to support politicians who they deem as competent, which is
a characteristic that many backsliders project through their forceful governing style.
For backsliding to yield to democratic resurgence, the removal of the authoritarian-minded
officials is likely necessary, but whether this removal is sufficient is where the remainder of
the dissertation comes into focus. Accordingly, the dissertation’s second main contribution is
to assess the prospects for democracy after democratic backsliding (Chapter 3 for successor
governments and Chapter 4 for voters). Democratization has historically been cyclical, and
after a long period of democratization, a trend toward reversion soon followed. This current
trend of democratic backsliding may be the response to the “third wave” of democratization,
but what comes after? This current moment of democratic backsliding is distinct from past
democratic reversions because of the lack of major seizures of power through a military coup,
popular uprising, or an autogolpe. Modern democratic backsliding involved the gradual
capture of institutions that both constrain an executive within government and outside of
government by damaging checks on the executive and electoral institutions respectively. The
incentives of successors to repair institutions or instead to retaliate against initial backsliders
may say a lot about how long the current backsliding moment will last. Simultaneously, the
preferences of former out-party voters for their new leaders also affect this path.
In Chapter 2, I find that societal threat is related to new democratic backsliding actions
through an original formal model and an empirical test of one of the implications of the
model. In the model, I show the relationships between higher societal threat and a voter’s
willingness to retain an incumbent. I derive expectations for the kinds of backsliding we
should observe more when societal threat is high, and the parameters that impact when
retention should be expected or not. As backsliding incumbents can project societal threat, I
also expect that competent incumbents will manipulate societal threat to engage in more
democratic backsliding. In the empirical application, I show a relationship between changes
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in factors that help measure societal threat and new backsliding actions. I specifically show a
relationship between social stability and external threats with new backsliding actions.
In Chapter 3, I use an original formal model to show that when restorative actions of
successors are not durable, or a future backslider can easily undo them, we should never
expect democratic institutions to be restored. The extent to which institutions are subverted
also impacts these preferences where as backsliding measures are more severe, restoration
is more attractive. Electoral safety of a successor in the absence of subverted institutions
increases incentives to restore depending on whether executive aggrandizement or the strategic
manipulation of elections is considered. Higher electoral safety makes restoring executive
constraints less likely, but makes restoring free and fair elections more likely.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I report an original survey experiment fielded in the United
States, showing that out-party voters prefer their leaders to retaliate more as the backsliding
incumbent engages in more extreme backsliding. This finding conflicts on the surface with
the implication from Chapter 3, that extreme backsliding should lead to greater restoration
preferences. This conflict between short-term and long-term incentives is crucial for the
prospects of democratic resurgence.
Ultimately, this work serves to move the backsliding literature forward toward further
consideration of the mechanisms through which democracy is repaired or destroyed. The
prospects for democracy is an area that will continue to be important in the coming decades,
and understanding the sometimes competing incentives that drive preferences both for leaders
and voters is crucial.
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Chapter 2
Threat Induced Voter Support For
Democratic Backsliding

2.1

Introduction

Why do voters support backsliding incumbents? Under what conditions are voters more
permissive of backsliding and can they be manipulated by incumbents? Backsliding events
have become more common in the past couple of decades (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019)
and generally the literature has focused on within-government factors such as the desire
to more quickly pass policy or societal factors like polarization. Voters also play a major
role because they can use their vote to punish incumbents that engage in backsliding or to
deter backsliding actions. Despite these tools, backsliding incumbents frequently maintain
power, so the study of how voter sanctioning of a backslider breaks down is important as an
additional explanation of how consolidated democracies backslide.
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Current explanations point to the role of polarized societies and partisanship to explain
why voters support incumbents that subvert democracy (Beaulieu 2014; Graham and Svolik
2020; Svolik 2018). Work has also shown that when voters are most concerned with competence,
competent incumbents can consolidate their power quickly and make removal difficult (Luo
and Przeworski 2019). These factors can be complicated when the intention of the incumbent
is uncertain (Helmke, Kroeger, and Paine 2019), and when backsliding actions are incentivized
(Grillo and Prato 2020; Nalepa, Vanberg, and Chiopris 2018). These explanations are helpful,
but miss a key area of focus of the campaigns of backsliders that interacts with polarization,
partisanship, and competence: societal threat.
I argue that voters can be especially motivated by societal threat — a perceived precursor
to a crisis in which there is an expected loss of status quo benefits — and alleviating the
potential consequences of a crisis. New, salient threats in the lead up to elections can be
a boon for the chances of backsliding incumbents, because the fear of crisis leads voters to
overlook subversion of democracy in favor of stability in the face of uncertainty. This can
happen even when voters generally support democratic norms and institutions. Societal
threat salience is not exogenous and can be mediated through the messages released by the
government, which can augment the salience of existing threats. This manipulation of societal
threat level can be used by backsliding incumbents to meet their goals, especially when they
believe voters may be swayed to support them with higher levels of societal threat. Electoral
campaigns are a key area where voters can punish the incumbent, therefore the focus on the
windows when voters can remove backsliding incumbents is necessary.
I construct a formal model that explores the voters’ choice to support backsliding
incumbents, specifically focusing on two kinds of backsliding: executive aggrandizement or the
weakening of constraints on policy making for the executive and the strategic manipulation
of elections or actions targeted at tilting the electoral playing field in an incumbent’s favor. I
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explore how these two different kinds of backsliding actions are made permissible to voters
via societal threat, along with other factors including: the level of democratic support of
voters, and the competence gap between the incumbent and challenger. I also consider when
incumbents can manipulate societal threat to benefit themselves.
I find that higher societal threat helps allow incumbents to engage in more democratic
backsliding. This is because societal threat justifies backsliding by making competent
incumbents more desirable. This gives competent incumbents the additional ability to engage
in backsliding. In the model, incumbents only engage in the strategic manipulation of
elections when they are not as competent as the challenger, so societal threat only benefits
competent incumbents and allows them to engage in further executive aggrandizement. Lastly,
these incentives make it so that when competent incumbents can manipulate and increase
threat (e.g., in Turkey, Erdoğan’s focus on the G´’ulen movement), they will do so in order to
engage in more backsliding. This gives some background as to why re-election campaigns for
backsliding incumbents are frequently focused on societal threat.
While some factors in the formal model are difficult to assess empirically, I focus my
empirical application on the relationship between societal threat allowing more democratic
backsliding. I use observational data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem)
(Coppedge et al. 2020) and the country-risk firm Fitch Connect to establish a relationship
between newer, salient societal threats and backsliding actions. By using a measure like those
from Fitch, I am also able to estimate real societal threat instead of threat manipulated by a
backsliding incumbent. I show in this empirical application that societal threats concerning
social stability and security with respect to external threats are significantly related to the
introduction of additional backsliding measures. This finding, paired with more nuanced
findings from the formal model, allow for a greater understanding of the importance of societal
threat in both enabling backsliders and improving their chances of retaining office.
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This work is important because it explores why backsliders are routinely re-elected, and
how these conditions lead to further democratic decline. The level of societal threat plays a
significant role in differential level of support for politicians. Increased focus on the conditions
within backsliding countries are important because the longer backsliders have control, the
more likely full democratic failure is to occur. Understanding the conditions when backsliding
incumbents are vulnerable to removal is crucial to identify when democratic resurgence may
be possible in the future.

2.2

Background

Misbehaving incumbents are ideally punished, but incumbents who engage in democratic
backsliding are commonly supported for re-election. This support is puzzling because it
challenges what we assume about democratic accountability. Further, even when a citizenry
generally supports democratic institutions that safeguard against overreach by bad actors,
these actions can be condoned by the re-election of a backsliding incumbent.
Much of the literature around democratic backsliding involves this breakdown of the
sanctioning process. I summarize past answers and discuss the relevant factors that are
central to my theory. Specifically, I focus on voters’ preferences for democratic norms
and institutions, and formal work that posits partisanship, polarization, uncertainty, and
incumbent competence as explanations for the support of democratic backsliders. Lastly,
I detail societal threat and how it has been used in other contexts to explain support for
authoritarianism and its relevance to democratic backsliding.
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2.2.1

Past Explanations

There is debate whether voters’ opinions of democratic norms and institutions are sufficiently
high for the persistence of democracy. More simply, whether democracy is only a “good”
thing when a voter’s preferred party is in power. While some have theorized that support for
democracy has fallen and this explains backsliding (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017a,b), others
question the decline of democratic values and believe that though generational changes have
made preferences for democracy change over time, there should still be a sufficient level of
support for democracy to persist (Alexander and Welzel 2017; Norris 2017; Voeten 2016).
A complementary explanation is that voters simply have majoritarian preferences and that
actions of a rightly elected incumbent are by nature democratic (Grossman et al. 2022).
Whether democratic values are robust or not, the declining preference for democratic norms
and institutions was a feature of backsliding movements in the twentieth century (Huntington
1991). For those in power, there are two key values that erode in backsliding regimes:
the mutual toleration of opposing parties who see competitors as legitimate opponents and
forbearance, where minority rule is valued by the majority in expectation of being a future
minority (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). These same values can permeate to voters and drive
selective preferences for democracy.
Even when preferences for democratic institutions and norms are high, backsliding
actions can manifest. Actions that approach backsliding, but do not fully cross the threshold,
are sometimes incentivized in democratic systems in the form of “constitutional hardball”,
where pushing constitutional limits within government is done in order to get more favorable
outcomes while in or out of power (Fishkin and Pozen 2018; Helmke, Kroeger, and Paine 2019;
Pozen 2018; Shugerman 2019). When this behavior is incentivized, authoritarian-minded
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politicians take advantage of the benefits of being able to engage in backsliding-adjacent
actions (Grillo and Prato 2020).
For example, in the United States, Senators engaged in “hardball” behaviors with respect
to judicial appointments from 2010 to 2020. Early in President Obama’s administration after
losing a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, Republicans began to increasingly filibuster
judicial nominees. In 2013, then Senate Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid ushered in
the “nuclear option” to change rules and remove the filibuster for appointments other than for
those to the Supreme Court. Upon gaining a majority in the Senate after the 2014 mid-term
elections, Republicans increasingly rejected President Obama’s judicial appointees culminating
in refusing to vote on Merrick Garland, a replacement for the Supreme Court in 2016. After
President Trump’s election in 2016 and the extension of the “nuclear option” to Supreme
court nominees, Republicans were able to successful pack both the Supreme Court and other
Federal Courts playing by much different rules than a decade before. These actions paid off
for Republicans because the Supreme Court has since produced favorable rulings on policy
priorities such as gun rights and abortion. A notable feature of constitutional hardball is that
none of these actions were illegal, and most were the result of rule changes or norm-breaking
behavior to overcome or introduce gridlock. Gridlock in government is a key component that
incentivizes constitutional hardball even among democratically-minded politicians, but it is
the authoritarian-minded counterparts that use these initial measures to springboard into
more explicit backsliding actions (Grillo and Prato 2020). This is important because it shows
that system incentives can overcome values for democratic institutions meant to safeguard
against backsliding. This pairs well with the existing literature around “constitutional qualms”
(Christenson and Kriner 2017a) where voters may support constitutional hardball actions for
the sake of overcoming obstacles and enacting or maintaining preferred policies.
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Beyond the distinction between hardball and backsliding, multiple explanations of voter
support of backsliders focus on political polarization and partisanship to overcome democratic
preferences. Generally, voters would support a challenger to a backsliding incumbent, but only
if the challenger’s policies are comparatively attractive. If the challenger is not sufficiently
moderate, then the voter is willing to overlook the incumbent’s backsliding because of the
incumbent’s more attractive ideological position compared to the challenger (Graham and
Svolik 2020; Svolik 2018). This similarly holds for voters with extreme preferences. Policy
extremism is a common feature of backsliding regimes (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013b),
but under explanations that focus under partisanship, this would require moderation that is
not common. Because backsliders are generally ideologically extreme and must also appeal
to a sufficiently large portion of the electorate to maintain power, this has highlighted the
role of polarization to explain where backsliding proliferates (Svolik 2018).
Polarization’s impact on citizen behavior can also be complicated by uncertainty of
the incumbent’s intentions (Nalepa, Vanberg, and Chiopris 2018). When the true intent
of the incumbent — preference for or against future backsliding — is unknown, it creates
uncertainty amongst voters. Polarization makes removing backsliding incumbents difficult
because supporters of the incumbent may be less willing to sanction borderline or minor
backsliding behavior because the alternative may be ideologically much less appealing. When
borderline behaviors go unrecognized, they may escalate into future backsliding actions.
Backsliding is a gradual process and this plays a key role because the desire to remove a
misbehaving incumbent may not be high enough to counteract polarization. That said, many
backsliders are more forthcoming about their intentions to change the system and thus their
motives may not require much divining beyond listening to the incumbent.
Distinct, but complementary to partisanship and polarization, other explanations have
focused on the role of competence and how especially competent incumbents use their
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popularity to consolidate power (e.g., Chávez in Venezuela and Erdoğan in Turkey). In this
explanation, voters are more likely to support an especially competent incumbent and will only
tolerate backsliding behavior up to a certain point. The location of this point is determined
by the preferences of voters (e.g., technocratic, institutionalist, or strict policy preferences).
However, after that point, it becomes difficult for voters to remove the incumbent because of
the backsliding advantage that was already enacted (Luo and Przeworski 2019)). Generally,
models do not consider when backsliding can also impact the ability to remove incumbents.
Therefore, this is an important factor to consider as it is a main goal of one of the two main
kinds of backsliding (the strategic manipulation of elections). In my theory, I consider the
role of competence more as it pertains to addressing crisis.
To summarize, existing work varies in the key causes that lead to backsliding, but
generally agree that a voter’s choice to remove a backsliding incumbent is often complex and
uncertain. As this complexity and uncertainty increases, it becomes more likely backsliding
goes unpunished, even when a voter supports democracy. This means that even though
we expect voters to observe and punish obvious instances of backsliding, they often do not.
From the literature, the factors that are worthy of focus are democratic preferences of voters
with respect to norms and institutions, the difference between the competence or ideological
position of the incumbent and challenger, and the different goals and outcomes of different
kinds backsliding actions. In addition to these, I propose that societal threat plays a key role
in the breakdown of sanctioning of backsliders: justifying backsliding actions by inducing
support for a competent incumbent.

2.2.2

Societal Threat and Authoritarianism

A societal threat is any factor that is perceived as a precursor to a crisis in which there
is an expected loss of status quo benefits. These crises can take several forms: terrorist
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attacks, violent crime, losing a job or savings, loss of social status, natural disasters, and
so on. Societal threat is a concept from the political psychology literature and has been
connected to support of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance preferences (Doty,
Peterson, and Winter 1991; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005). I
extend the use of the concept as a factor to induce support for backsliding.
Any given country has some level of societal threat, but backsliding regimes commonly
have elevated levels of societal threat that affects politics. Societal threats may not be actual
precursors to crisis, but they must be seen that way for a voter. Alternatively, they may
be presented that way to a voter. Consider that in the United States, the areas with the
lowest proportion of immigrants tend to have the highest opposition to immigration (Luca
et al. 2022). The central motivator of societal threat is that voters have an intangible fear
of a crisis in which something will happen that will make them worse off. When voters are
focused on societal threat, negative outcomes can occur such as lower trust in government,
lower engagement in politics, and support for less democratic actors. Table 2.1 provides
examples of societal threats and crises that may arise as a result of these threats.
Table 2.1: Examples of Societal Threats and Potential Crises.
Societal Threat Examples
Rising Immigration
Climate Change
Rising Crime
Economic Stagnation
COVID-19
Rising Violence/Terrorism

Perceived Potential Crises
Personal economic hardship, impending loss of status, crime
Personal experience with natural disasters, loss of housing or resources
Being a victim of violent crime, living in an unsafe neighborhood
Loss of a job, housing, or savings
Getting sick or dying, a loved one getting sick or dying
Personal impact of mass-shooting or terrorist attack

Note: Societal threats do not need to be actually related to the potential perceived crisis. In some of the
cases, the reverse relationship is true (i.e., in the U.S. immigrants are less likely to commit crimes). Societal
threat operates at the psychological level, so the perception of a potential crisis is what is needed, not a
direct empirical connection.

The literature tying societal threat and authoritarianism (or the authoritarian personality)
is well established in political psychology and has focused on how societal threats can activate
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latent authoritarian preferences in order to address potential crises (Adorno et al. 1950; Sales
1973). The presence of high societal threat has been tied with several authoritarian outcomes
such as: support for the death penalty in sentencing (McCann 2008), social dominance
(Duckitt and Fisher 2003), hate crimes (Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991), and more support
for hawkish military involvement and less support for civil liberties during the “War on Terror”
(Hetherington and Suhay 2011). While threat is generally thought to work specifically on
those high on the right-wing authoritarian (RWA) personality trait (Lavine, Lodge, and
Freitas 2005), people low on this scale have also been shown to be susceptible to societal
threat (Hetherington and Suhay 2011), so it is an important consideration of all voters in
how it impacts support for backsliders.
When considering backsliding more directly, societal threat has been studied under
the context of support for far-right populists, or the radical right which has been a group
specifically focused on backsliding in recent years (i.e. Hungary, Poland, and the United
States). Specifically, the salience of identity issues and the success of minorities in society
(minorities’ growing success is perceived as taking away from the majority) has been shown to
be a significant motivator of far-right party success (Bustikova 2014; Lucassen and Lubbers
2012). The idea of cultural backlash contributing to insecurities and status threat has
also been tied to the rise of right-wing authoritarian-minded leaders who are thought to be
especially susceptible to backsliding (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Mutz 2018). The immigration
of ethnic minorities is a common cultural threat used by right-wing backsliders for these
reasons. In addition to culturally defined threats, economic issues in the form of import shocks
from rising globalization have been tied to the growth of support for far-right and populist
parties (Baccini and Sattler 2021; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2021; Colantone and Stanig 2018).
While not all backsliding regimes are marked by a far-right or generically extreme ideology,
the role of societal threat in the rise of eventual backsliders has been well documented.
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Lastly, under the threat of terrorism, voters have been shown to overlook the reputation of
right-wing incumbents while punishing left-wing incumbents (Di Lonardo 2019). Consider
that violence from the PKK (a Kurdish separatist group) in Turkey has commonly been used
my Erdoğan to justify the crackdown on the HDP (the primarily Kurdish political party)
and to disenfranchise Kurdish voters with support of nationalist Turks (BBC 2015). It is
unsurprising then, that the same role that societal threat played in raising the position of
extreme voices would also be instrumental in how support for backsliders develops with time.
Outside of support for the radical right, which is not the sole perpetrator of backsliding
(e.g., Chavéz in Venezuela), research has also shown that societal threat and crisis can precede
democratic erosion. Terrorism has been shown to endanger democracy in the target country
(Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), widespread discrimination has been tied to democratic
instability (Goldstone et al. 2010), and economic inequality can also be a driver of eroding
democratic quality (Bermeo 2009; Slater, Smith, and Nair 2014). Societal threat is an
important component that can determine vote choice by targeting the security of voters.
I theorize that the role of societal threat with respect to democratic backsliding helps
offset the “sting” of backsliding by preferring a more competent leader. More specifically,
societal threat offsets negative opinions of backsliding actions because it induces support for
a competent incumbent that can alleviate the negative impacts of a potential crisis. This is
especially the case when a voter sees a challenger as especially incompetent or even a threat
itself. Because societal threat is a mostly psychological concept, determined at a community
or country level and interpreted at the individual level, it is an especially useful tool for
backsliders to use to their advantage.
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2.3

Societal Threat’s Impact on Backsliding

In regimes where incumbents backslide, elections and re-election campaigns can be particularly
contentious. Voters have the opportunity to sanction and remove the incumbent, but this
choice can be made more difficult depending on the conditions within the country. Despite
the ability to remove backsliding incumbents, voters commonly vote to affirm undemocratic
leaders. A key reason for this breakdown is the role that societal threat plays in justifying
backsliding actions by inducing support for a competent leader. This dynamic produces
additional incentives for an incumbent to highlight the level of societal threat within the
country and can lead to a tumultuous environment when the choice of voters to sanction
backsliders is crucial for the persistence of democratic institutions.
Backsliding has been described as a reactionary process to elements within or outside
of government (Dresden and Howard 2016) and past research on societal threat has shown
that voters are also reactive when societal threat is high (Hetherington and Suhay 2011;
Sales 1973). I propose that higher societal threat levels play a key role in voter support of
democratic backsliders. When societal threat is high and a strong leader is needed, voters
shift from sanctioning the incumbent’s undemocratic performance to selecting a competent
leader who can deal with a potential crisis. This general process has been documented in
the literature of democratic accountability for other misbehaving incumbents (Fearon 1999;
Przeworski et al. 1999; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000) and especially relevant with respect
to backsliding. All voters have some general support level of democratic institutions and
norms instilled through the “civic culture” (Almond and Verba 1963), but when voters feel
threatened they are willing to bend some from their values, especially when it means choosing
a competent leader. I adopt the concept of incumbent competence (Luo and Przeworski 2019)
and extrapolate it to dealing with potential crisis.
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A competent incumbent is able to effectively act during a future crisis in a voter-approved
manner. Competence subsumes some other factors such as partisanship, but is distinct because
it also relies on experience and ability to minimize the impacts of a future crisis. For example,
if rising crime is seen as a salient societal threat, a competent leader for one voter may heavily
focus on funding police in a “tough-on-crime” approach, whereas another may prefer a focus
on transformative justice and reforming the justice system to fix “root causes.” Either of
these approaches may convey competence to a voter, but is also interpreted in terms of other
traditionally important factors like partisanship. The focus on competence in this theoretical
approach is especially useful, because backsliders are usually seen as strong leaders due to
their forceful governing approach, so they can project competence. In the model, I assume
both the societal threat level and the competence of both the incumbent and challenger are
exogenous, but both are subject to manipulation and other endogeneity. While I consider
the manipulation of societal threat later, I do not do the same for competence, but this is an
important future direction. Ultimately, societal threat can help incumbents get away with
backsliding, and this has implications for how societal threat plays into voters’ preferences.

2.3.1

Additional Considerations of Societal Threat

When incumbents are competent and they expect minor backsliding actions will be punished,
they are incentivized to increase the salience of societal threats to justify their past actions
and take advantage of voter insecurity. By being able to make the decision murky and
manipulate voters’ ability to judge their record, incumbents can reduce the potential negative
impacts of democratic accountability via their removal from office (Maravall 1999). For
supporters of leaders that border demagoguery, a focus on the fears of voters can help skirt
accountability (Mercieca 2020). In the absence of high societal threat, an incumbent may
choose to manufacture or augment societal threats and potential crises to meet their needs.
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In this case, a backsliding incumbent may latch onto something minor so he can raise the
societal threat salience around an issue or invent a threat all together (i.e. the Trump
administration’s focus on migrant caravans in the lead up to the 2018 and 2020 elections).
The threat, augmented or artificial, usually highlights an issue area where incumbents or
their parties have some issue ownership, in order to draw distinction with the opposition and
signal competence and the ability to deal with crisis. In some ways, this is counter-intuitive,
because incumbents should be highlighting their own successes, and focusing on the unstable
nature of the country may not seem to achieve this. However, in the setting of an electoral
campaign with an untested and/or more democratic challenger, this strategy can be effective
and take advantage of the insecurity of voters.
Despite the role that societal threat can play in a voter’s decisions to support backsliding
incumbents, the presence of societal threat does not necessarily mean that it will induce
incumbent support. Voters who do not view the incumbent as particularly competent would
not be expected to react to threat by supporting the incumbent. In fact, it can have the
opposite effect of increasing the support for the challenger. Societal threat is ultimately a
psychological concept and its impact happens at the individual level, so the threat of certain
crises may move voters very little.
Lastly, we should expect voters to respond to threat differently depending on the kind of
backsliding measures employed. I distinguish between two key gradual kinds of backsliding
that incumbents use: weakening other political institutions that can challenge the executive
or executive aggrandizement and weakening the ability of the political opposition to win
elections or the strategic manipulation of elections. While executive aggrandizement is likely
to be a negative act for voters concerned with democratic institutions, this group of voters
may not be large enough to prevent backsliders from maintaining office. Especially since
these voters would need to be sufficiently knowledgeable about the separation of powers and
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the administrative state. When incumbents strategically manipulate elections, voters may
react more strongly. This is because the main input voters have in the democratic process is
voting and when this is impacted, voters may have strong negative feelings that change their
behavior.
To illustrate that different backsliding actions may activate voters differently, consider
the example of Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral race. The election was re-run after questionable calls
of fraud from President Erdoğan, after his party (AKP) lost the seat after holding it since
1994.4 In the follow-up election, the opposition party increased its margin of victory from
13,000 votes to 800,000 votes (or from 0.16 to 9.22 percentage points), and turnout rose.
This was the one of the first instances of Erdoğan alleging voter fraud in his nearly 17 year
tenure, and it was met with a groundswell against the ruling party. There is reason to believe
that the strategic manipulation of elections is seen differently by voters in Turkey, especially
because the AKP had engaged in wide-reaching executive aggrandizement for much of the
last decade with little electoral punishment. Societal threat also likely played a role in this
result, but in a way that hurt the AKP. A significant financial crisis was the main backdrop
to the election which most Turks saw as the responsibility of the government’s ruling party.
This was in contrast to previous societal threats utilized to justify backsliding such as violence
from the PKK (a Kurdish militant group) used to justify cracking down on the HDP and
the 2016 coup attempt leading to the creation of a new constitution and purging the civil
service. Different societal threats likely serve different ends, and may not always be positive
developments for a government if it can not project competence.
Ultimately, we should expect a few things about the nature of elections with backsliding
incumbents. First, the level of societal threat matters in voters’ decision making, especially
4

The AKP has held the seat since 2004. Before that, the seat was held by the FP, the predecessor to
the AKP, since Erdoğan’s election to the seat in 1994. This personal attachment to the seat was seen as an
additional reason Erdoğan fought so hard to re-run the election after the narrow loss.
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when there is a disparity between the competence of the incumbent and challenger. Second,
even when democratic values should indicate that voters sanction backsliding incumbents,
societal threat can help a competent incumbent justify backsliding actions. Third, when
incumbents know that they can benefit from a higher-threat environment than their current
environment, they will act to increase threat salience to improve their chances of re-election,
but this may backfire under some conditions. And lastly, the two different kinds of backsliding
operate differently in this framework because they have structural differences in practice
and voters view them with different levels of severity. The focus on societal threat and the
different backsliding tools available pairs well with, and builds on, past work to explain how
sanctioning of backsliding incumbents often breaks down. This explanation also provides
room for democratic actors to focus on limiting the role of threat messaging that can dominate
election time in backsliding states.

2.4

Model Set-Up

There is some known state of the world ω ∈ (0, 1), where ω represents societal threat — the
probability that a crisis will occur in the next period after an election. I focus on two actors:
an incumbent (I) and a pivotal voter (V ). There is also a challenger (C) which is present as
an alternative to the incumbent, but has no strategic behavior. I first detail the the actors,
their choice sets, and payoff functions. After, I summarize their strategies and beliefs.

2.4.1

Actors and Information

The incumbent (I) and challenger (C) have a fixed level of competence known at the beginning
of the game. I define competence as the level of skill and expertise a politician has in dealing
with crisis as preferred by the voter (V ). This value includes factors such as experience and
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partisanship. Importantly, competence is not a stand in for partisanship, but partisanship
can moderate how competence is assessed by a voter. Consider that different politicians may
have different responses to a crisis that are influenced by ideology, but I combine these factors
into one measure that the voter uses to evaluate her choices. Ultimately, the voter is the most
interested in selecting the most competent politician who can minimize the impact of a crisis
should it occur. I use Ω to indicate whether a crisis occurs where Ω ∈ {0, 1}. When Ω = 1, a
crisis occurs after the election and when Ω = 0, no crisis occurs. Societal threat (ω) is the
probability that a crisis will occur or: P(Ω = 1) = ω. The competence of the incumbent is
represented as ϕI and the competence of the challenger, ϕC . The difference between these
two (ϕI − ϕC ) is the competence gap: ϕ̃. Generally, I assume ϕ̃ > 0, or the incumbent is
more competent, but also consider the reverse case.
The Incumbent
At the beginning of the game, the incumbent assigns effort over two different kinds of
backsliding: executive aggrandizement and the strategic manipulation of elections. The
incumbent assigns effort based on the choice of e where eA corresponds to the amount of effort
placed into executive aggrandizement and eM is the amount of effort placed into the strategic
manipulation of elections where eA ∈ [0, 1] and eM ∈ [0, 1]. When eA = 1 the incumbent
maximally engages in executive aggrandizement. When eM = 1, the incumbent maximally
manipulates elections. When effort is equal to zero for a given action, that kind of backsliding
action is not enacted. After observing the incumbent’s choices (eA and eM ), the voter will
either choose to re-elect the incumbent (R = 1), or elect the challenger (R = 0). If re-elected,
the incumbent receives a benefit of office for another term in the form of b > 0.
Executive aggrandizement allows the incumbent to remove institutional constraints
against governing in both the present and the future. If eA > 0, the incumbent will receive
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an additional benefit of office bA > 0 for being able to institute policy more easily both in the
current period, and in the future if re-elected. This benefit is moderated by the effort assigned
to executive aggrandizement (eA ∗ bA ). Lastly, retaining office is always more preferred to
executive aggrandizement: b > bA .
The strategic manipulation of elections allows incumbents to entrench themselves and
make it more difficult for voters to remove them from office. If eM > 0, and the voter chooses
to remove the incumbent (R = 0), the voter will fail to remove the incumbent with some
probability: eM ∗ f where f ∈ (0, 1). When election subversion is successful, even though
the true preference of the voter was to remove the incumbent, the strategic manipulation of
elections allowed the incumbent to maintain power. Future payoffs are subject to a discount
factor: δ ∈ (0, 1). Ultimately, the incumbent is interested in maintaining office and engaging
in executive aggrandizement when possible. The incumbent’s utility can be expressed as
follows:

UI (R, eA , eM ) =




eA bA + δ(b + eA bA )

R=1



eA bA + eM f δ(b + eA bA ) R = 0

The Voter
The voter begins the game by viewing the societal threat level ω and the competence of the
incumbent, challenger, and this gap (ϕI , ϕC , and ϕ̃). In the event that a crisis occurs (Ω = 1),
the voter will receive a negative payoff, t > 0. The value of ϕ of the victorious candidate can
lessen the impact of this threat where the actual payoff is −(t − ϕ) where ϕI < t and ϕC < t.
In the absence of a crisis (Ω = 0), there is no penalty.
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The voter also has preferences for democratic norms and institutions. These preferences
are represented by β < 0, where negative values indicate that a voter is opposed to backsliding
actions and supports democratic institutions and norms. The voter has specific opinions
on both kinds of backsliding: βA for executive aggrandizement and βM for the strategic
manipulation of elections. These values can be thought of as the negative cost of having a
backslider for another term in office and are weighted by the incumbent’s backsliding efforts:
eA ∗ βA and eM ∗ βM .
The voter uses all of the above information to make the decision of whether to choose the
incumbent or the challenger. Absent backsliding, the voter is only interested in selecting the
more competent leader5 . The voter only has payoffs after the election, so I do not discount
these payoffs. The voter is concerned both with the negative payoff of having a backslider in
office in the future as well as the competence of the winner, because this can directly limit
her negative exposure to a crisis should it occur. The general utility function for the voter is
determined by R, eA , eM , and Ω:

UV (R, eA , eM , Ω) =




eA βA + eM βM − Ω[(t − ϕI )]

R=1



eM f (eA βA + eM βM ) − Ω[eM f (t − ϕI ) − (1 − eM f )(t − ϕC )] R = 0

Sequence of Play
Before the game begins, fixed values of the competence of the incumbent ϕI and challenger
ϕC , societal threat ω, and the voters opinions of both kinds of backsliding βA , βM are known
to all players. Then the game begins:
5

This same assumption is used in Luo and Przeworski (2019).
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1. The incumbent chooses effort values eA and eM .
2. Based on I actions, the voter V either re-elects (R=1) the incumbent I or elects (R=0)
the challenger C.
3. If R = 0 and eM > 0, incumbent maintains power with probability eM ∗ f . Otherwise,
the voter’s choice is respected.
4. After the election, a crisis occurs Ω = 1 with probability ω.
5. Payoffs realized by players.

2.4.2

Strategies

I begin with the voter’s strategy because it has a direct impact on the choices of the incumbent.
I then break down the incumbent’s preferred actions given the behavior of the voter.
The Voter
The voter maximizes the expected utility of retaining or removing the incumbent given the
effort levels eA and eM , the level of societal threat ω, the magnitude of negative cost should
a crisis occur t, the revised penalty voters place on another term under a backslider βA and
βM , and the competence parameters of the incumbent ϕI and challenger ϕC . Given the
parameters, the expected value of the voter’s payoff given the choice to re-elect or not is:



eA βA + eM βM − ω[(t − ϕI )]
R=1
EUV (R, eA , eM ) =


eM f (eA βA + eM βM ) − ω[eM f (t − ϕI ) + (1 − eM f )(t − ϕC )] R = 0

When the voter chooses a backsliding incumbent, the negative payoff of diminished
democracy is combined with the term that dictates the probability of crisis after the election.
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Should a crisis occur, the competence of the incumbent is important to the voter because it
diminishes the negative payoff of the threat. When the voter chooses to remove the incumbent
and there is not electoral subversion (eM = 0), the voter does not incur a negative payoff
from backsliding and her payoff relies on the competence of the challenger in the event of a
crisis. When subversion does occur (eM > 0), an incumbent that strategically manipulates
the election may retain office if the voter chooses to remove with probability eM f . Therefore,
depending on the incumbent’s effort allocation eA and eM the voter must assess whether
EUV (R = 1) ≥ EUV (R = 0) and if so, the voter will choose to re-elect. The incumbent
knowing this information can then consider what action to choose given the parameters.
The Incumbent
The incumbent knows what the voter will do depending on the values of the parameters
listed above and makes decisions based on the expectation of retaining office or not and the
benefit of engaging in executive aggrandizement (bA ). I will explain these strategies in terms
of EUV (R = 1) ≥ EUV (R = 0) for the voter, because the incumbent is acting with this in
mind, and the incumbent’s own payoffs when applicable.
I first consider the much more likely case when the incumbent is more competent: ϕ̃ > 0.
Backsliding incumbents are generally seen as strong leaders due to their forceful governing
style and should be able to project a high level of competence. The incumbent’s chief goal is to
be re-elected. Absent backsliding, the incumbent will always be re-elected if more competent
than the challenger. In this case, societal threat only impacts the voter’s preferences with
respect to competence and alleviating potential crisis.
The incumbent’s secondary goal is to engage in as much executive aggrandizement as
possible. If the incumbent backslides and the voter’s negative opinions of backsliding outweigh
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the advantage from being more competent than the challenger, then we should not expect
backsliding. In this case, the best choice for the other effort value is eM = 0. This is both
because engaging in the strategic manipulation of elections serves no benefit for incumbent in
terms of payoffs; and because it may lead the voter to choose R = 0. The following identifies
the maximum possible value of eA where retaining office is still certain and also demonstrates
the mechanism through which higher competence helps offset more democratic backsliding:

eA βA − ω(t − ϕI ) ≥ −ω(t − ϕC )
eA βA ≥ ω(t − ϕI ) − ω(t − ϕC )
eA βA ≥ −ω ϕ̃
eA ≤ −

ω ϕ̃
βA

(2.1)

If inequality 2.1 holds for eA = 1, then the voter will re-elect (R = 1) for any amount of
executive aggrandizement up to the maximum amount. Also, because βA is negative, there
is a sign flip. To refocus this cut-off in terms of societal threat, I restate inequality 2.1 in
terms of ω. I substitute eA = 1 so this is the level of societal threat where the incumbent can
engage in the max executive aggrandizement and still retain office with certainty:

−

ω ϕ̃
≥1
βA
ω≥−

βA
ϕ̃

(2.2)

If inequality 2.2 does not hold, but inequality 2.1 holds for some value of eA = e∗A =
−ω ϕ̃/βA and the righthand side is less than 1, then the incumbent must decide whether
this value is preferable to more democratic backsliding. By choosing this effort value, the
incumbent would receive the payoff: UI (R = 1, eA = e∗A , eM = 0). As stated previously, when
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R = 1, that the incumbent has no incentive to set eM > 0 because it has no payoff benefit.
The alternative, where the incumbent chooses some effort for executive aggrandizement
eA > e∗A will also lead the voter to select R = 0. After this threshold is passed, when R = 1,
all further increases in eA and eM increase UI , so the best choice when R = 0 is eA = 1 and
eM = 1. This produces the following payoff: UI (R = 0, eA = 1, eM = 1). So, the incumbent
decides whether the more minor executive aggrandizement under certain re-election is better
than giving up election certainty for maximum subversion or UI (R = 1, eA = e∗A , eM = 0) ≥
UI (R = 0, eA = 1, eM = 1). I set up this inequality in terms of the incumbent payoffs given
these actions and solve for e∗A . On the right-hand side, because eA = 1 and eM = 1, the effort
values drop out. After solving for e∗A , I plug in −ω ϕ̃/βA and solve for ω to represent this
threshold in terms of societal threat:
e∗A bA + δ(b + e∗A bA ) ≥ bA + f δ(b + bA )
e∗A ≥
−

bA (1 + δf ) + δb(f − 1)
bA (1 + δ)

bA (1 + δf ) + δb(f − 1)
ω ϕ̃
≥
βA
b (1 + δ)
 A

βA bA (1 + δf ) + δb(f − 1)
ω≥−
bA (1 + δ)
ϕ̃

(2.3)

If inequality 2.3 holds, the societal threat level is sufficient for the incumbent to prefer a
lower level of executive aggrandizement e∗A to maximal subversion under an uncertain election
result. Generally, I expect the incumbent to prefer e∗A unless f is very high.6 In this case, the
role of the voter is mostly irrelevant because elections can be subverted to an extreme degree.
For a backsliding incumbent up for re-election for the first time, f should be much closer to 0.
6

Consider the case of f=0. This produces the following: ω ≥ − βϕ̃A
bA
b

h

bA −δb
bA

i

, which is negative when bA < δb.

Because bA < b, then for sufficiently high values of δ >
when f is low, there will never be an incentive to
maximally subvert. As f rises, the maximal subversion option becomes more attractive.
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Finally, I consider when the incumbent is less competent: ϕ̃ < 0. In this case, the voter
always chooses R = 0. As stated earlier, in order to maximize payoffs and the chance to
retain office under subverted institutions, the incumbent chooses eA = 1 and eM = 1 and
expects UI (R = 0, eA = 1, eM = 1). This is one case where societal threat is not relevant
because its role with respect to competence hurts the incumbent regardless. I generally do
not expect this case because I expect an incumbent to project competence, but it gives some
expectations for a comparatively incompetent incumbent attempting to maintain power. I
expand on the incumbent’s choices more later when the incumbent can manipulate threat.

2.5

Properties of Equilibrium

With the actors and strategies set up, I can now set up the equilibria and explore the factors
that impact them. I first focus on how the voter responds to societal threat. Specifically, the
ways different parameters and the incumbent’s effort levels impact the level of societal threat
when the incumbent is either retained or replaced. Then I establish the incumbent’s best
actions in terms of societal threat and under which effort levels the incumbent can engage
in backsliding and be retained in terms of societal threat thresholds. Lastly, I use these
thresholds to consider when the incumbent can augment societal threat, and show under
which scenarios this is expected and how it impacts the incumbent’s effort levels.

2.5.1

Voter’s Reaction to Societal threat

I focus on the preferences of the voter and how changes to parameters and the incumbent’s
effort levels affect whether the voter re-elects a backslider. I consider preferences in terms of
societal threat and expand the expression EUV (R = 1|eA , eM ) ≥ EUV (R = 0|eA , eM ):
eA βA + eM βM − ω(t − ϕI ) ≥ eM f (eA βA + eM βM ) − ω[eM f (t − ϕI ) + (1 − eM f )(t − ϕC )]
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I simplify the inequality, and solve for ω to identify the critical threshold that societal threat
must rise above for the voter to prefer retaining the incumbent when the incumbent backslides.
I substitute ϕ̃ for ϕI − ϕC to make the competence gap a single parameter. This process
yields the equation in lemma 1.

Lemma 1 (The Threat Cutoff for a Voter to Support a Backsliding Incumbent)
The societal threat threshold ω ≥ ω ∗ at or above which the voter supports the incumbent is:

ω∗ =

(eM f − 1)(eA βA + eM βM )
ϕ̃(1 − eM f )

Lemma 1 identifies the critical value of societal threat level ω ∗ that induces incumbent
support from the voter given other parameters. This equation is true for any values of the
effort parameters where retention is possible, including when backsliding is not present. When
the voter chooses to retain the incumbent even after backsliding, I call this a sanctioning
breakdown. I take the partial derivative of ω ∗ with respect to the parameters of interest to get
comparative statics for parameters of interest. These are general results to show how various
parameters behave in the model. The main choices established for the incumbent are the
most important component and I will detail those after.

Proposition 1 (Comparative Statics for Sanctioning Breakdown) The critical threat
level needed for a voter to retain a backsliding incumbent is:

i. Decreasing in ϕI − ϕC ≡ ϕ̃.
ii. Decreasing in βA and βM ϕ̃ > 0.7
iii. Increasing in eA and eM when ϕ̃ > 0.
7

βA and βM are negative because they are the penalty for retaining a backsliding incumbent, so this result
can also be interpreted as increasing in democratic preferences.
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Proposition 1 shows how the parameters of interest impact the critical societal threat
threshold needed for a voter to prefer retaining the incumbent given a set of parameters.
In practice, this means that as the incumbent increases the competence advantage over the
challenger (larger ϕ̃), the level of societal threat needed for democratic sanctioning to fail
is lower. As the voter has less negative opinions of backsliding actions (higher βA or βM ),
the societal threat level needed for incumbent retention decreases. As effort values increase,
the societal threshold rises. Most of these results are reliant on the incumbent being more
competent. Without a competence advantage, the statement EUV (R = 1|eA , eM ) ≥ EUV (R =
0|eA , eM ) can never be true.
Now that I have analysis for how different parameters interact with societal threat with
respect to the voter’s preferences, I can conclude the model by considering when an incumbent
can benefit by raising the salience of societal threat.

2.5.2

When Incumbents Can Manipulate Societal Threat

Proposition 1 established how societal threat and other parameters impact the voter’s choice
to retain or remove the incumbent. I now consider an incumbent who is aware of the voter’s
behavior and is able to manipulate the salience of societal threat. Incumbents are focused
primarily on maintaining office and secondarily being able to more easily enact their preferred
policies by engaging in executive aggrandizement. When incumbents are unsure of their
re-election prospects, they may rely on the strategic manipulation of elections to increase their
chances of re-election. When I detailed the incumbent’s strategies earlier, I discussed their
best responses knowing the voter’s preferences. I now restate those preferences with respect
to the societal threat level needed in order for certain backsliding actions to be preferable or
not.
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Lemma 2 (Incumbent Actions In Basic Model) The incumbent’s best choices given
the following conditions are:

i. When ϕ̃ > 0 and ω ≥ − βϕ̃A , I chooses eA = 1 and eM = 0.
ii. When ϕ̃ > 0 and − βϕ̃A > ω ≥ − βϕ̃A
iii. When ϕ̃ > 0 and ω < − βϕ̃A

h

h

bA (1+δf )+δb(f −1)
bA (1+δ)

bA (1+δf )+δb(f −1)
bA (1+δ)

i

i

, I chooses eA = − βωAϕ̃ and eM = 0.

, I chooses eA = 1 and eM = 1.

iv. When ϕ̃ < 0, I chooses eA = 1 and eM = 1.

Lemma 2 shows the incumbent’s best responses given the competence gap, the level of
threat, and the payoffs. I incorporate the inequalities from section 2.4.2 to construct the
thresholds of ω where different actions are preferred and resultantly the four parts of lemma
2. Inequality 2.2 is the threat threshold where at or above, the incumbent can assign effort
eA = 1 (part i). Below this level, the incumbent needs to assign some value reflected in
inequality 2.1 and for this to be preferred, the societal threshold established in inequality
2.3 must be true (part ii). Below this threshold, full subversion (eA = 1 and eM = 1) will
be preferred (part iii). When the incumbent has no competence advantage, there are no
relevant threat thresholds and full subversion will be chosen (part iv). This approach helps
the incumbent both get the maximum payoff and maximize the probability of retention under
subverted electoral institutions.
Using this information, we can now consider the ability of the incumbent to manipulate
the threat level. Suppose that the incumbent can increase the level of societal threat for some
cost c to a value ω̄ where 1 > ω̄ > ω. This ability to raise societal threat impacts the actions
of the incumbent. In practice, we are looking to incumbents detailed in lemma 2 who with
higher threat can engage in more backsliding than previously possible.
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Proposition 2 (Incumbent Actions with Threat Manipulation) When the incumbent
can manipulate threat, more executive aggrandizement is possible when:

(i) When ϕ̃ > 0, bA > c, and ω̄ > − βϕ̃A > ω, I chooses eA = 1.
(ii) When ϕ̃ > 0, eA bA > c, and − βϕ̃A > ω̄ > − βϕ̃A

h

bA (1+δf )+δb(f −1)
bA (1+δ)

i

, I chooses eA = − βω̄Aϕ̃ .

In both scenarios in Proposition 2, a higher, manipulated level of societal threat allows
incumbents to engage in more executive aggrandizement than otherwise would be possible.
For incumbents in (i), this allows increase effort from eA = − βωAϕ̃ to eA = 1. This increased
effort corresponds to incumbents going from part ii of lemma 2 to part i because of the
increased societal threat level. For (ii), a higher level of eA is now possible than before:
− βω̄Aϕ̃ > − βωAϕ̃ . This higher effort level corresponds to a change within part ii of lemma 2. I do
not consider the case of an incumbent moving from part iii to ii because this is a case where less
backsliding occurs, and I expect part iii to be rare. This result shows that when incumbents
can manipulate the threat level, this creates more situations where incumbents engage in
executive aggrandizement while maintaining power. This does not impact more strategic
manipulation of elections, because only less competent incumbents engage in it (except for
part iii in Lemma 2). The ability to exaggerate existing threats can be a powerful tool for
competent incumbents to use in order to maximize their ability to engage in backsliding
without being removed from office. Higher threat does not benefit less competent incumbents
because voters will not prefer them for any level of societal threat. This gives greater context
to threat-focused campaigns of backsliders such as the focus on immigration in Hungary,
Poland, and the United States or the focus on violence from the PKK in Turkey.
There are three main takeaways from the formal model. The first, and the focus of the
empirical application in the next section, is that higher societal threat helps allow incumbents
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to engage in more democratic backsliding. This is because societal threat justifies backsliding
because voters are willing to overlook actions to retain competent incumbents, and higher
threat allows the incumbent to get away with more backsliding. Second, higher societal threat
allows competent incumbents to benefit from executive aggrandizement. This is because
only incumbents that are less competent or close to the competence of the challenger will be
expected to strategically manipulate elections. Lastly, incumbents that manipulate or raise
the salience of societal threat are more likely to be engaged in executive aggrandizement.
While some of these conclusions rely on concepts like voters’ preferences for democracy or
a competence gap between incumbent and challenger, I believe the finding that additional
threat allows for additional backsliding is an important testable implication of this model. In
the next section, I show a connection between new backsliding actions and changes in some
measures of societal threat from year to year.

2.6

Data for Empirical Application

While some elements of the formal model are difficult to adequately measure such as incumbent and challenger competence or aggregated voter preferences for democratic norms
and institutions, there are two concepts that can be estimated to empirically evaluate an
important outcome of the model: increased societal threat allows for additional democratic
backsliding actions. In order to evaluate this empirically, I need appropriate measures for
both change in democracy and societal threat at the country-year level. I use data from
V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020) and Fitch Connect to measure these concepts respectively.
First, the Varieties of Democracy of Project (V-Dem) has a considerable historical
database that categorizes and evaluates institutions at the country-year level. V-Dem
provides hundreds of different indicators to classify governments, the quality of democracy,
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Table 2.2: Summary of High Level Indices from V-Dem
Indicator

Motivating Question

Liberal
Democracy

To what extent is the ideal of
liberal democracy achieved?

Polyarchy/
Electoral
Democracy

To what extent is the ideal of
electoral democracy in its
fullest sense achieved?

Participatory
Democracy

To what extent is the ideal of
participatory democracy achieved?

Clarification/Components
constitutionally protected civil liberties;
strong rule of law;
an independent judiciary;
executive checks and balances that, together,
limit the exercise of executive power
suffrage is extensive;
political and civil society organizations can operate freely;
elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities;
elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country;
freedom of expression and an independent media between elections
The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active
participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral
and non-electoral

Note: Each of these measures is bounded 0-1 where the higher the value, the more complete democracy as
defined is realized.

and several other important concepts. I work with three different high-level indices from VDem that aggregate several of the more granular measures to assess macro-level considerations
of democratic quality. One of the measures best approximates the kind of democracy attacked
through executive aggrandizement: liberal democracy. This value falls where there are less
checks and balances between government institutions. For example, an executive engaging in
executive capture of the judiciary would produce a lower score in this measure. The other
two capture institutions attacked by the strategic manipulation of elections: basic or electoral
democracy which captures the concept of “polyarchy” from Dahl (1971) and participatory
democracy. The Polyarchy measure helps ascertain the more basic electoral institutions, while
the participatory democracy measure is a more rigorous standard that evaluates voters’ access
to the system. These two indexes help give a more complete understanding of institutions
attacked through the strategic manipulation of elections. While in the formal model only
executive aggrandizement had a positive relationship with societal threat, this was largely
driven by the modeling choices where the result of the election is known with certainty based
on the values of parameters and the preferences of the pivotal voter. In practice, that level of
certainty is not possible, so I include measures of both kinds of democratic backsliding. The
description from V-Dem for each measure is in table 2.2.
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To assess threat, I use a country-risk dataset from Fitch Connect. While societal threat
can manifest in several different ways, I believe this data allows for assessing some key societal
threat concepts that I summarize in table 2.3. Crisis can manifest in several different ways and
these measures help assess several different kinds of societal threats that can be used to justify
backsliding. Not all threats are beneficial for a backsliding incumbent though, and we should
not expect all of the threat measures to impact backsliding to the same degree. Through
these various measures, I can evaluate economic, social, and security/physical threats. I
anticipate that some of these threats will be more useful to justify backsliding than others,
especially those related to social threats and physical/security threats. Lastly, these measures
are useful for estimating actual societal threat, and not exaggerated claims of backsliding
incumbents.
Table 2.3: Societal Threat Measures from Fitch Connect
Measure

Definition
Kinds of Threats Estimated
Reflects unemployment, inflation,
Social Stability Index
Economic and Social Threats
and public unrest
Reflects security threats, regional
Security/External Threats Index
Physical/Security Threats
profile and international constraints
Growth risk; monetary risk; fiscal risk;
Short Term Economic Risk Index
Economic Threats
external risk; and financial risk.
Conditions with respect to interstate
conflict risk, terrorism and crime,
Crime and Security Index
Physical/Security Threats
including cyber crime and organized crime
GDP Growth
Year change in GDP as percent
Economic Threats
Note: Each of these measures, except for % GDP, is bounded 0-100 where higher values indicate less threat
in each of the categories.

The empirical strategy I use is OLS regression to assess the year change of each of
the democracy measures from V-Dem. I use the change from the previous year for each of
the three high-level V-Dem indexes as the dependent variables because certain threats may
not help backsliding incumbents engage in backsliding equally. The change in each threat
measure from the previous year is used as the independent variables because it is the increase
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of societal threat that provides the cover for new backsliding actions. I control for logged
GDP because wealth plays a substantial role in democratization (Bunce 2000; Geddes et al.
1999; Lipset 1959; Milner and Mukherjee 2009; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). I also control
for each of the three democracy index scores from the given country-year observation to make
sure the results are not driven by regime quality. Lastly, I use year fixed effects.
This empirical strategy helps estimate the year-to-year impact of societal threat changes
on democratic backsliding the most effectively given the availability of data. In the model,
I transform the V-Dem measures by multiplying them by 100, so an increase of a societal
threat measure (which indicates societal threat decreased) is on the same scale as a change
in the democracy measures.

2.7

Empirical Results

The goal of this empirical application is to clarify whether factors that we might identify as
societal threats actually produce the effects from the formal model. By including several
measures of societal threat that may affect voters, I can identify which factors are especially
important in relation to new democratic backsliding measures. Societal threat is a macro-level
concept interpreted at the individual level, and different societal threats may provide more
cover for democratic backsliding than others.
The results from the empirical strategy are in table 2.4. In this case, each model
corresponds to a different dependent variable for the various democracy indices from V-Dem.
For the purpose of interpretation, a positive coefficient for a threat indicator means that a
year decrease in the societal threat index (higher threat) is associated with a decrease in the
democracy measure (additional democratic backsliding).
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Table 2.4: Results for the Impact of the Change of Societal Threat on the Change of
Democratic Indicators

∆ Social Stability
∆ Security and External Threats
∆ Short Term Economic Risk
∆ Crime and Security
% GDP Growth
Intercept
Observations
R2

∆ Liberal Dem

∆ Polyarchy

∆ Participatory Dem

0.048∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.011
(0.019)
0.0005
(0.021)
−0.002
(0.020)
0.792
(0.993)

0.040∗∗
(0.017)
0.075∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.028
(0.022)
−0.009
(0.023)
0.0004
(0.023)
−0.700
(1.110)

0.017
(0.013)
0.039∗
(0.020)
0.012
(0.016)
−0.001
(0.017)
0.014
(0.017)
−0.135
(0.811)

1,006
0.031

1,006
0.031

1,006
0.017
∗

Note:

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

These results provide some insight as to how the change in threat environment in a
given year allows for more or less backsliding from an incumbent. In this case, both the
social stability measure and crime/external threat measures provided positive and significant
coefficients for two of the democracy measures. This would show that these factors may be
threat types that especially allow for new backsliding actions, which is how societal threats
behave in the model. Whereas the others do not capture the kinds of societal threats with
the theorized effect. The coefficients are small, but each of the dependent variables are tightly
distributed around a mode of zero and this impacts the substantive significance.
To better show the magnitude of these findings relative to the dispersion of the data,
I show the distribution of the year-change of each of the dependent variables in figure 2.1.
This figure shows that small changes in democratic quality are particularly common from
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year to year. When these are aggregated over the course of a backslider’s term in office or
over multiple terms, these small changes become increasingly more important.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Change in Democracy Measures.

Note: Because most of the observations are concentrated around zero, I bounded these figures to better
show the distribution around zero. This omits 81 observations in panel A, 104 in panel B, and 58 in panel C
that were either greater than 5 or less than -5.

To put these results into greater context, consider an example where the social stability
measure falls by 10 in a given year. This would be associated with a 0.48 reduction in the
liberal democracy measure and 0.4 reduction in the Polyarchy measure when controlling
for the previously mentioned factors and the other threat indicators. While this seems like
a relatively small change, because of the nature of the measures, this is still noteworthy
and could indicate some additionally damaged institutions. For example, in the United
States in 2018, there was a 0.5 decline in the Polyarchy measure and a 0.6 decline in the
liberal democracy measure. This was the year of the start of the highly controversial family
separation policy at the southern border and the protest response to these actions8 . While
the changes may seem small, because they are at the year level, the impact over several years
is considerable.
8

These specific examples were sources from the Democratic Erosion Event Database or DEED.
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Ultimately, the societal threats measures with respect to social stability and security
or external threats proved to behave in line with the formal model. Other measures that
help assess societal threats, but did not behave as societal threat did in the formal model
include short-term economic risk, crime and security, and percent GDP growth. These
differences make sense, because some examples of societal threat may not have sufficiently
looming crises that induce voter support for democratic backsliding and resultantly make
democratic backsliding possible for incumbents. Future work can include additional examples
of societal threat, or engage in individual-level analysis of the relationship of societal threat
and backsliding support in a survey experiment. This may allow for assessing some of the
more nuanced results from the model such as the ability to engage in more democratic
backsliding while being able to manipulate societal threat.
Democratic backsliding is a gradual process over the course of several years, so small
changes from year to year can add up over the course of a backslider’s term in office, and
establishing that threat has an impact in these changes is noteworthy. Further, because each
of these measures is just one example of a way that societal threat may manifest, a societal
threat related to social stability may provide cover to subvert institutions one year, while
a more salient security or external threat may justify a backsliding action in a subsequent
year. At the aggregate, these strategies can be helpful to successfully maintain power while
engaging in backsliding actions. Lastly, because societal threat can only work against a
backslider if they are incompetent in the face of crisis, different kinds of threats may give the
necessary cover to overcome shortcomings in one area.
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2.8

Conclusion

How democratic backsliders maintain power is a question that is increasingly more important
in the study of democratic backsliding. While the normative hope is that leaders who subvert
democratic norms and institutions are punished and removed, this is commonly not the case.
Existing work has explored the role of partisanship and polarization and how these factors
allow backsliders to maintain power because voters care more about policy than democracy.
I posited that societal threat also plays an important role in how these factors relate to voter
support of democratic backsliding.
I argued that societal threat impacts a voter’s evaluation of an incumbent’s tenure by
raising the importance of a voter selecting a competent leader. I also considered how different
kinds of backsliding that can be employed impact these dynamics. These factors were featured
in my formal model where I concluded that additional societal threat provided room for more
democratic backsliding. I showed additional results to indicate that the kinds of backsliding
employed are also important. Specifically, I showed that executive aggrandizement should
be particularly aided by societal threat and was the backsliding that competent incumbents
would be most likely to engage in. These findings, paired with existing understanding of
polarization and partisanship, help give an additional dimension to the understanding of why
voters may vote to retain backsliding incumbents.
I also empirically tested a main conclusion of my formal model, that additional societal
threat allows more democratic backsliding. I evaluated this theoretical implication by using
observational data from the Varieties of Democracy Project to measure democratic quality
and its changes as backsliding, and societal threat indicators from a country risk dataset
from Fitch Connect. I showed that changes in societal threat from one year to another were
related to changes in democratic quality. These results specifically showed that additional
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societal threat from social stability and external threats were associated with backsliding at
the country-year level. When these results are aggregated to the government or term level,
societal threat can be an important component in providing cover for incumbents to engage
in, and to get away with democratic backsliding.
The expectations from the formal model and results from the empirical give additional
insight as to why backsliders are typically retained despite their misdeeds. Societal threat
is a potent force in justifying backsliding misdeeds by leading voters to support an especially competent leader, who is usually the incumbent. This would mean that only under
circumstances like the Istanbul Mayoral Race of 2019 where societal threat worked against
the ruling government should we expect societal threat to lead to punishment. Lastly, even if
societal threat is not high, incumbents can manipulate its salience to benefit themselves.
This theoretical framework pairs well with existing expectations and provides an explanation for why incumbents may not be retained due to a competence disadvantage. In the next
two chapters, I consider when incumbents are able to be removed from power and whether
the prospects for democracy are promising given the removal of a backsliding incumbent.
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Chapter 3
What Does the Opposition do After
Democratic Backsliding?

3.1

Introduction

What does the opposition do after democratic backsliding? The study of democratic backsliding has generally focused on precursors to and the early stages of an authoritarian-minded
democratically elected leader seizing power. But what happens after that backslider is out
of power? Successors9 have three main choices they can make: retaliate and escalate an
undemocratic cycle, focus on repairing institutions to stave off democratic deconsolidation
at the expense of policy goals, or take a path somewhere in between. The importance of
this choice is considerable, because a successor can either aggressively respond to an initial
backslider and pave the way for a cycle of backsliding that can culminate in full democratic
9
This paper focuses on opposition successors who were at odds with the previous backslider. I expect
successors to backsliders of the same party (e.g., in Venezuela Nicolás Maduro succeeding Hugo Chávez after
his death, or PRI in 20th century Mexico) to behave in a similar way to their predecessors.
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failure, or leave the misdeeds of an initial backslider as an aberration by restoring democratic institutions. We can better understand the long-term consequences of this decision by
exploring the incentives that shape that choice.
While a successor to an initial backslider’s choice to restore institutions or not has not
been studied, there is existing work that informs expectations for this choice and how it is
made. Most of these expectations come from the more established democratization literature
which tracks how a country moves from autocracy to democracy. Democratization is distinct
from backsliding because states with recently removed backsliders have intact, albeit damaged,
democratic institutions and their voters have existing democratic preferences and expectations
that are not present in autocracies that move toward democracy. Despite these important
differences, the choices of an autocrat looking to reform and a successor considering whether
to restore norms and institutions have useful parallels. Work on elite-driven democratization
provides some useful explanations of the conditions under which autocrats reform institutions
and make them more democratic (Dahl 1971; Gonzalez 2008; Haggard and Kaufman 1999,
2016). Specifically, the way leaders focus on maximizing security and minimizing risk is
central to the choice of when and how to institute reforms (Riedl et al. 2020; Schedler 2002).
For autocrats, the concern is creating enough legitimacy to stave off a popular uprising
while maintaining sufficient control. Successors to backsliders should behave similarly by
weighing the restoration of legitimate institutions, which constrain both future opponents
and themselves, with short-term policy goals and the desire to keep the initial backslider out
of office.
I theorize that three factors shape the decision of the successor whether to restore by
repairing norms and institutions to their previous state and refusing to engage in further
norm-breaking behavior, or retaliate by continuing the use of damaged institutions and normbreaking behavior to the successor’s benefit and against opponents. First is the durability of
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the restoration or whether restorative actions pursued by a successor are likely to constrain
a future undemocratic actor. If a future backslider can unravel restorative measures with
relative ease, then the incentives for the successor to constrain their actions, only to have an
opponent not play by the same rules, are not present for restoration to be attractive. Second,
is the magnitude of the subverted institutions. In other words, this is the difference between
the outcomes provided by damaged institutions when in power and out of power. If damaged
institutions allow marginally better results for an incumbent, then the risk of eventually
being out of power is not enough of a deterrent to maintain damaged institutions. The final
factor is electoral safety or how confident the successor feels in the ability to win future office.
Electoral safety plays a considerable role in determining whether policy is prioritized at the
expense of democratic restoration because short-term gains and long-term strategies may
conflict.
I develop an original formal model in which a newly elected government has the option
to restore institutions or retaliate after two kinds of democratic backsliding: executive
aggrandizement where constraints on the executive have been weakened so that policies are
easier to pass, and the strategic manipulation of elections where elections had been made less
free and fair and thus tilted towards the incumbent. When successors restore institutions,
it impacts their ability to enact their preferred policies and makes election outcomes more
fair. When successors retaliate, they can enact their preferred policies more easily and win
re-election with greater certainty. Restoration is durable when restorative actions are binding
for future leaders, and if those are not binding, restoration is not durable. For the magnitude
of the subverted institutions, I consider both kinds of backsliding and how the institutions
they impact drive advantages with respect to either policy making or electoral performance.
Lastly, I conceptualize electoral safety as the baseline probability that the successor gets
elected absent electoral manipulation.
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I find that the most important factor to determine preference for restoration is durability. I
explored durability by considering two extreme conditions: an optimistic case where restoration
is completely durable and can never be reversed, and a pessimistic case where restoration
is never durable and will always be reversed a successor loses re-election. When restorative
actions are not durable, restoration is never preferred, but under durable restoration, there
are some conditions where restoration is preferred. I also find that, under durable restoration,
more aggressively subverted institutions for both kinds of backsliding make maintaining
backsliding less attractive for the successor. Additionally, under durable reforms, electoral
safety has different effects on maintaining the two kinds of backsliding. As electoral safety
increases, successors prefer restoring executive constraints less, but prefer restoring free and
fair elections more. These results are driven by the nature of the institutions attacked and
have important implications for successor preferences. Finally, by assessing durability using
two extreme cases — completely durable and completely non-durable restoration — I can
assume that restoration can be preferable, under some conditions, even when restorative
measures are not completely durable. Restorative measures are likely to fall somewhere
between fully durable and never durable, so this is an important and noteworthy finding.
As backsliding regimes in countries like Turkey, Hungary, and Poland are likely to
eventually yield to the opposition, a greater understanding of what happens after this is
novel and important. When conditions are favorable for backsliding to continue, a long
term series of tit-for-tat actions can snowball into far worse outcomes that can culminate
in full democratic failure. However, with some attractive conditions, such as sufficiently
large electoral safety, and strong consequences for maintaining backsliding in the future,
restoration can be not only a normatively beneficial path, but the optimal path. The rigorous
interrogation of these incentives in the formal model allow for important initial work on this
important window of opportunity to counteract backsliding.
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3.2

Background

The democratization literature provides a useful starting point for thinking about how
successors in a post-backsliding state will behave. Democratization is defined in terms of
a transition from autocracy to democracy, but because of the broadness of this definition,
it is difficult to establish a uniform theory (Rustow 1970). Some historically relevant
democratization theories are less useful to the backsliding case such as: modernization theory
(Lipset 1959) and its addendums (Bunce 2000; Geddes et al. 1999; Milner and Mukherjee
2009; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), theories of consociational democracy (Andeweg 2000;
Lijphart 1977), the authoritarian legacy of the state (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead
2013), and the early process of institutionalization (Huntington 1968). These theories mostly
outline how states develop democracy out of nothing, which is not the baseline condition of
backsliding states looking to reform. I instead focus on work that has outlined the uncertainty
in democratization, work on reform-centered explanations that track under what conditions
autocrats gradually institute democratic institutions, and work on fledgling democracies
in the wake of authoritarianism. While the context of this literature is both fledgling and
emerging democracies, focus on fragile democracies on the verge of repair is a useful extension
of these theories. I will summarize this literature and connect it to backsliding to show what
we can learn.
In formerly authoritarian regimes, there is uncertainty when transitioning to democracy.
The state goes from a certain authoritarian state to an uncertain “something else” (O’Donnell,
Schmitter, and Whitehead 2013). This general approach is helpful for recently backsliding
countries because of the uncertain choice of the new government. The choice of the next
government — or current, in most democratization literature — is whether to democratize or
not. Much of this work also focuses on the role of liberalization by increasing individual rights
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and institutionalization of civil society, elections, and political parties or pacts. While these
concepts are notable features of more traditional transitions, under damaged democracies
these factors are less important. Most damaged democracies need to repair institutional
arrangements like electoral rules and restore the civil society, but the creation of new
institutions from the ground up is not necessary. The same goes for individual rights, which
I assume are mostly present in order for a country to be considered a democracy in the first
place. These sorts of choices will not be a significant focus of this study; instead I focus on
the institutional democratic restoration a new executive can undertake in relation to existing
institutions after a backslider yields. The uncertain choice is between the current subverted
state or an uncertain arrangement of some or all restored institutions.
Beyond uncertainty, a major question in the democratization literature is why autocrats
introduce democratic reforms that may eventually lead to their removal. This top-down
approach to democratization is distinct from instances of popular rebellion and the early
choices of a new government to democratize because it is often gradual and calculated
so that the autocrat can safely maintain power. Reform centered explanations show that
franchise expansion (Dahl 1971; Haggard and Kaufman 1999, 2016) and the break up of
political monopolies (Gonzalez 2008) are sometimes employed by the authoritarians, albeit
under conditions where it is safe to do so (Riedl et al. 2020; Schedler 2002). This cautious
approach to expanding democratic institutions and norms is usually to add legitimacy to the
autocrat and prevent the popular rebellions that would result in a bottom-up approach to
democratization. Successors of initial backsliders inherit damaged institutions that they can
either wield for their own purpose, or restore. Similar to reforming autocrats, restoration is
more likely when the successor feels safe doing so. While autocrats reform to give greater
legitimacy and prevent violent uprising, successors may restore democratic institutions to
constrain themselves, and also future backsliding-minded leaders. For this to be possible, the
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new rules would need to be either sufficiently beneficial, or be able to sufficiently constrain
opponents in the future.
Other than top-down reform in autocracies, there are also historical instances of fledgling
democracies with recent authoritarian legacies that are useful to look toward. In states with
successors to autocrats, there is a similar trade-off for successors to backsliders: the desire to
develop new democratic institutions in a bottom-up approach, and the concern of keeping the
former autocrat or like-minded autocrats at bay during this fragile period. In a fragile setting
like post-Fujimori Peru, where a personalist autocracy yielded to an unstable party setting,
initial democratic hesitancy in order to ward off any potential autocratic actors set the
groundwork for a meaningful democratic system accountable to voters (Kelly 2003; Levitsky
1999; Levitsky and Cameron 2003). This sort of democratization with initial guardrails has
relevance to successors of initial backsliders. While post-backsliding countries start with
fleshed-out institutions and some history of democratic competition, these considerations
are important for successors to weigh in their decisions to restore institutions, or do so
more carefully to avoid a future backsliding threat. Past understanding shows that the
former opposition may attempt to aggressively institute measures to limit the role of past
authoritarians in government (Linz and Stepan 1978). While this is probably normatively
the most beneficial route to prevent autocratic resurgence, it may also lead to a cycle of
autocratic actions if pursued beyond the short-term. This same dynamic is important to
evaluate in terms of backsliders: immediate reform may be much more detrimental than a
more gradual reform process.
Using this historical understanding of democratization and modernizing it to fit a context
where democratic institutions, albeit weak ones, are in place, lends to some expectations
of how we should expect the successors of initial backsliders to behave when they enter
office. Ultimately, the most useful parts of the democratization literature for thinking about
64

post-backsliding choices are the considerations of security and risk. I believe security impacts
choice in two ways: how secure a successor feels in office and whether restorative actions
will be respected in the future. Meanwhile, risk is dependent on the nature of the damaged
institutions themselves. Taking over powerful institutions today may be attractive, but if
those powers can also be used against the successor in the future, restoring them may be
the best course. I explore these concepts more in the next section where I detail the options
available and how different conditions may lead the former opposition to behave once they
regain power.

3.3

When Will Successors Restore Institutions?

After democratic backsliding occurs and an opposition party comes into power, there are
several options that the successor can take. The successor can use weakened institutions
to pass preferred policies and maintain power with greater certainty. This option may be
attractive for successors, but it can set the stage for future resurgence of backsliders and
perpetuate an undemocratic cycle that may lead to democratic failure. Conversely, the new
government can prioritize repairing and restoring institutional constraints and norms, to
the detriment of policy goals and the certainty that comes from more favorable electoral
institutions. Under this option, a successor constrains actions today in hopes that future
actions by an opponent are also constrained. Lastly, the successor may pursue a hybrid
approach, blending the need for undoing existing policies, preventing future resurgence of
backsliders, and restoring select democratic institutions. I distinguish between two groups
of backsliding strategies that can be enacted: executive aggrandizement and the strategic
manipulation of elections

10

. I generally assume that by the time a backslider is removed

10

See table 1.2 in Chapter 1 for a more detailed description of these strategies and examples of actions that
fall under both.
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from power, both kinds of backsliding have been enacted and the successor has two different
sets of damaged institutions that they can either repair or maintain.
Under executive aggrandizement, within-government constraints on the executive have
been attacked. When these constraints are damaged, it is easier for the executive to exert its
will over other elements of government that it does not traditionally control. In practice, this
allows the ruling party to more easily implement their preferred policy program. Consider the
case of Poland where the PiS aggressively reshaped judicial institutions and the composition
of constitutional courts. A successor to the PiS may retaliate by executing similar measures
in order to reshape courts in favor of the successor to be able to more easily pass policies,
but adding to the volatility of the institution. Meanwhile, the successor could restore the
judicial institutions by reforming court appointments in order to de-politicize the institutions
and make the courts more balanced. In both cases, these measures would require significant
action, and produce very different results, especially depending on the expected behavior of a
future backslider.
Under the strategic manipulation of elections, the electoral institutions have been
manipulated in ways to make removal of the incumbents or entry of opponents more difficult.
These actions help make the ruling party more entrenched and able to maintain power for
a longer time than otherwise possible by requiring a larger majority or plurality of voters
to remove the ruling party than under completely free and fair elections. Consider the
2022 Hungarian Parliamentary elections where, under a mixed-member parliament, the
constituency districts were drawn such that the ruling party won 87 of 106 districts with
52.5% of the vote11 . A successor to Fidesz, should they overcome this hurdle and enter office,
could retaliate by re-drawing lines to benefit the new governing party and disadvantage the
11

This amounted to 82% of seats available in that tier. Under the proportional party list, the ruling
coalition won 48 of the 93 seats (about 52% of the seats) with 54% of the vote in that tier.
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initial backslider’s party. Conversely, the successor can restore electoral institutions either by
requiring more balanced districts, or only using the proportional tier so that different parties
can win with a majority of the votes and no party is entrenched12 .

3.3.1

Factors that Feature in the Formal Model

Using this understanding of both sets of backsliding actions and how restorative and retaliation
measures produce different incentives for successors to initial backsliders, I can detail some
expectations that I will expand upon more rigorously in the formal model. I argue that there
are three key factors that shape the choice of a successor to reform institutions or not: the
durability of the restorative measures, and the magnitude of the subverted institutions, and
electoral safety.
The durability of restoration is the most important component for the successor. If
successors believe that restorative measures cannot be easily undone if the backslider’s party
regains power, then restoration is durable. Absent this durability, the incentives for successors
to constrain themselves, only to have their opponents not play by the same rules, are not
sufficient for restoration to be attractive. Consider a case where a successor chooses to restore
an executive constraint by limiting extent to which executive actions bypass the legislature, as
was the norm before the initial backslider’s tenure. This action may prove to be detrimental
if a future backslider does not mind breaking that norm for a second time. However, if the
norm is expected to be durable in the future, it may prove to be a necessary and beneficial
sacrifice.
12

Empirically distinguishing between restoration and retaliation may be a slightly more complex endeavor
considering that institutions are changing in favor of the successor regardless of the path. I assert that a
democratic indicator should be able to capture the difference as one path is a notably more democratic
development than the other. To other actors such as supporters of the initial backslider, there may be little
distinction, so the difference between impressions of democratic quality and objective democratic quality, to
the extent that it can be achieved, is an important area for empirical consideration in future work on this
topic.
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The magnitude of both kinds of backsliding actions — or the extent of the subversion
of executive constraints and electoral institutions — is also an important determinant for
the successor’s decision. Small subversive measures can produce different incentives than
wide-ranging attacks on democratic norms and institutions. This concept is also dependent
on the kinds of institutions that have been damaged. For executive aggrandizement, the
range of policies that can be enacted without executive constraints is larger than the range
of policies available when constraints are in place. In the formal model, I use a parameter
for the level of polarization of policy positions absent executive constraints to capture this
concept. I consider polarization as the ideological distance between parties. In other words,
if two polarized parties are competing against each other, a successor may be more inclined
to constrain institutions because the alternative when out of power is significantly worse
compared to the benefit in power.
With respect to the strategic manipulation of elections, I refer to the severity with which
electoral institutions were attacked as the subversion advantage. In this case, assuming that
every time one of two parties enters office, the incumbent can entrench itself in office to
some degree, the difference between these two outcomes is the subversion advantage. In
other words, the level of entrenchment when a backslider is in power minus the level of
entrenchment when a successor is in power. A moderate advantage relative to the baseline
today may not be worth it if a severe disadvantage is possible under a future backslider. I
expect more subverted institutions are less appealing for a successor to maintain.
A successor has electoral safety when they believe that, absent any electoral manipulation,
they have a sufficiently high probability of being re-elected. Electoral safety is an important
component in the choice to restore institutions because it may provide the reforming successor
more time in power should they choose to eschew subverted electoral institutions. This
expectation impacts preferences for restoration. If a successor enters office and has a narrow
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opportunity to act before yielding again, there may be different consequences for different
institutions. For example, if a successor has a low level of electoral safety there may be
more incentives to restore executive constraints in expectation that their opponent will spend
more time in power later. Simultaneously, they may prefer the boost from damaged electoral
institutions when in power and choose not to restore that set of institutions. I expect electoral
safety to not have the same impact on both sets of backsliding actions for this reason.
Ultimately, the successor’s choice is crucial for the future of a democracy. If a successor
is policy and power motivated, then the desire to restore institutions may be low, and this
can continue a cycle of backsliding that culminates in democratic failure. Even if a successor
is interested in restorative measures, there are numerous institutional factors that can make
restoration advantageous or not. The durability of restorative measures, the magnitude of the
damaged institutions, and electoral safety all can shape the choice: sometimes in competing
ways. The decision of a successor is important to fully understand because the removal of a
backsliding incumbent may not be sufficient to stem the tide of backsliding.

3.4

The Formal Model

Consider two parties, B and D (a backslider and a democratic successor), with policy positions
on a number-line where party D has a bliss point at XD = 0, and party B at XB = c where
c > 0. At the beginning of the game, party D beat incumbent party B which had instituted
backsliding measures. In the wake of backsliding under party B there are two different ways
institutions have been attacked. There were attacks on constraints against the executive or
executive aggrandizement, and attacks on the electoral system or the strategic manipulation
of elections.
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In the absence of executive constraints, parties implement their bliss point, but when
executive constraints are in effect, there is some inner range of acceptable policies that can
be enacted: [a, b] where 0 < a < b < c

13

. Under the backslider, the executive constraints

were removed. Executive constraints are either in effect, or not, but if they are in effect, the
magnitude of the constraints is impacted by the range of a and b. The utility of each party
is the distance between their bliss point and the existing policy Xt at time t, subject to a
quadratic penalty. The game begins at time t = 0. Payoffs are subject to a common discount
factor δ. The basic payoffs per period are:

uD (Xt ) = −(Xt )2
uB (Xt ) = −(Xt − c)2

I conceptualize c as the magnitude of executive aggrandizement because it is the range of
acceptable policies, whereas under executive constraints, the comparative value is b − a. An
alternative way to interpret c is the magnitude of polarization. When executive constraints
are in place, the parties select policies from the range of [a, b], but absent constraints, the
region increases to [0, c]. As c increases, the policy penalty for D when B is in office becomes
higher, so the constrained policies may become more appealing.
Typically there is uncertainty around elections due to robust democratic electoral
institutions. The winner of free and fair elections at time t is determined by a probability, where
under normal conditions B wins with probability pN ∈ (0, 1) without loss of generalizability.
I use 1 − pN to represent D’s electoral safety. As pN increases, electoral safety decreases.
Electoral institutions have been subverted by the backslider, so that the office holder has a
higher probability of re-election than they would under a free and fair election. Under D, the
13

This configuration of policies is inspired by Alesina (1988).
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probability of B’s victory is pD and under B it is pB , where 0 < pD < pN < pB < 1. The
magnitude of subverted elections is conceptualized as the subversion advantage or pB − pD .
The subversion advantage helps represent the magnitude of the difference of electoral fortunes
depending on the party in power14 .
At the beginning of the new government, both of these sets of institutions, previously
used against D, can now be leveraged in its favor. Party D has separate choices to restore
or retaliate on one or both of executive aggrandizement and the strategic manipulation of
elections. When restorative measures are durable, D’s choices remain in place for the rest
of the game, even when B returns to power. Conversely, when restorative measures are
not durable, D’s choices remain in place only until B returns to power for the first time.
After, B attacks restorative measures and institutions revert to their subverted states for the
remainder of the game.
In the analysis, I only analyze the restoration decision of D, but this requires taking
into account the future actions of B when it regains office. I achieve this by constructing
a discounted infinite-horizon continuation payoff for D’s decisions under the condition of
durable or non-durable restoration. In other words, I examine an optimistic and a pessimistic
equilibrium in an infinite-horizon game respectively, but instead of mapping B’s payoffs, I
proceed as though its optimal action takes one of two extreme forms. In the case of durable
reform, B finds it rational to maintain D’s restoration of whichever institutions it chooses.
This occurs if B’s payoffs and expectations made B willing to pursue a tit-for-tat or grim
trigger pattern of future reforms and backsliding: as long as D maintains either or both types
of restoration, B will respond in kind. In the case of non-durable reform, B is not cooperative
with restorative measures, so it will return to backsliding whenever it returns to office and
14

If manipulation is equivalent to gerrymandered districts, then pD represented the prospects of D being
able to re-draw its own tilted electoral districts. If manipulation is control of election judges or other
infrastructure, then pD helps estimate those same institutions captured by D and party D partisans.
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regardless of D’s restorative measures. After this, I assume D will also give up on restoration
when it regains office for a second time.
Finally, I use an infinite horizon game for two key reasons. First, D must consider its
actions both in terms of present utility and in the event that B returns to power. It is
the risk of B re-entering power that drives the desire of D to restore institutions. Second,
while institutions are only subject to D’s choice and durability in the model, backsliding
is a multi-step process that occurs over the course of multiple terms in office. Considering
the future horizon of institutions gives greater realism to the model and provides useful
functionality for the sake of solving. The events proceed as follows:

1. At time t = 0, party D wins the election and inherits subverted institutions.
2. Party D chooses to restore one, both, or neither institution. If restorative measures
are durable, these choices are fixed for the remainder of the game. If measures are not
durable, then restored institutions will be subverted permanently after B’s first victory.
3. If executive constraints are in effect, party D implements X0 = a. Otherwise X0 = 0.
4. If elections are free and fair, P(B wins) = pN . Otherwise pD . Leader for t = 1 chosen.
5. Under executive constraints, if D wins it enacts Xt = a, and if B wins it enacts Xt = b.
Absent executive constraints, D enacts Xt = 0 and B enacts Xt = c.
6. Payoff from Xt discounted by δ t .
7. Under free and fair elections, the winner for t = t + 1 is determined by pN . Absent free
and fair elections, the winner of the next period is determined by pD if D holds office
and pB if B holds office.
8. Steps 5-7 are repeated infinitely.
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3.4.1

Continuation Values and Durability

The choice to restore institutions is based on D’s continuation value (forward-looking payoff
for the remainder of the game) given its actions and durability. I detail the continuation
values first for durable restorative measures and then for non-durable restorative measures.
There are four different potential combinations of restored or not institutions and each
has its own set of continuation values. I used the symbol V for when both institutions are
restored, W for when only electoral institutions are restored, Y for when only executive
constraints are restored, and Z for when neither set of institutions is restored. For each of
these symbols, there is a different result depending on which party is in power. For example,
V D is the continuation value for party D when it is in power and V B when B is in power and
all institutions are restored. The continuation values are listed in terms of each other such
that V D is in terms of itself and V B . Continuation values for each combination of institutions
V , W , Y , and Z are in table 3.1
Table 3.1: D’s Continuation Values for Each Combination of Institutions (Durable)

Notation
V
W
Y
Z

Interpretation
The payoff when both sets of
institutions are restored
The payoff when only electoral
institutions are restored
The payoff when only executive
constraints are restored
The payoff when neither set of
institutions are restored

CV given the current office-holder
V D = uD (a) + δ[(1 − pN )V D + pN V B ]
V B = uD (b) + δ[(1 − pN )V D + pN V B ]
W D = uD (0) + δ[(1 − pN )W D + pN W B ]
W B = uD (c) + δ[(1 − pN )W D + pN W B ]
Y D = uD (a) + δ[(1 − pD )Y D + pD Y B ]
Y B = uD (b) + δ[(1 − pB )Y D + pB Y B ]
Z D = uD (0) + δ[(1 − pD )Z D + pD Z B ]
Z B = uD (c) + δ[(1 − pB )Z D + pB Z B ]

When restorative measures are not durable, the continuation values are not in terms of
themselves the same way because only D plays by the new institutional rules. After B’s first
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return to power, any restored institutions revert to the subverted state. These continuation
values are in table 3.2. For an example of how these differ, consider V D in table 3.1 and V D∗
in table 3.2. V D is represented in terms of itself and V B or the terms where both institutions
are restored depending on the office holder. When restorative measures are not durable, V B
will never occur because B will immediately subvert institutions when it returns to office.
Therefore, V D∗ is represented in terms of itself as long as it maintains power uninterrupted,
but after B wins for the first time, is in terms of Z B when B is in power and Z D when D
returns to power.
Table 3.2: D’s Continuation Values for Each Combination of Institutions (Non-Durable)

Notation
V
W
Y
Z

Interpretation
The payoff when both sets of
institutions are restored
The payoff when only electoral
institutions are restored
The payoff when only executive
constraints are restored
The payoff when neither set of
institutions are restored

CV given the current office-holder
V D∗ = uD (a) + δ[(1 − pN )V D∗ + pN Z B ]
W D∗ = uD (0) + δ[(1 − pN )W D∗ + pN Z B ]
Y D∗ = uD (a) + δ[(1 − pD )Y D∗ + pD Z B ]
Z D = uD (0) + δ[(1 − pD )Z D + pD Z B ]
Z B = uD (c) + δ[(1 − pB )Z D + pB Z B ]

I use these two sets of continuation values to derive the conditions for equilibrium first for
non-durable restoration, and then for durable restoration. I introduced these in the reverse
order because the in durable the institutions do not change, so it is easier to set up. Deriving
the conditions for equilibrium for the durable case is much more involved though, so I begin
with the results for non-durable restorative measures. The ways in which V D∗ , W D∗ and
Y D∗ differ from V D , W D and Y D show the impact of the durability of restorative measures
and how it impacts the willingness of a successor to restore institutions.
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3.5

When Restoration is Not Durable

I begin by solving the more simple case where restorative measures are not durable. In this
case, given any choice of D for restorative measures, B will always undo them when it regains
power. After this occurs, D reverts to the damaged institutions should it regain office as a
sort of grim trigger response. This scenario is the most pessimistic approach to restorative
choices. In table 3.2, I detailed continuation values absent durable restoration. To evaluate
when restoration is appealing, I compare the continuation values when D restores one or
both sets of institutions, V D∗ , W D∗ and Y D∗ , to the continuation value when D does not
restore any: Z D .
In each of the cases where D restores institutions, it gives up either or both the policy 0
for a and the probability that B wins of pD for pN for as long as D maintains power, and
after which point, the values revert to the less democratic alignment. I show that it is never
advantageous for D to restore institutions when they are not durable.
I first prove why reforming electoral institutions is never preferable by comparing the
continuation value W D∗ , where D enacts non-durable electoral restoration, and Z D , where
no institutions are restored. For W D∗ , let T be the random variable giving the number of
periods D stays in office when pursuing electoral restoration. In each period 1, ..., T the
policy choice will be 0, and D’s payoff will be uD (0). T has a negative binomial distribution
with parameter 1 − pN . For Z D , let T ′ be the number of periods D stays in office if D does
not pursue any institutional restoration. In each period 1, ..., T ′ , the policy choice will be
0, and D’s payoff will be uD (0). T ′ has a negative binomial distribution with parameter
1 − pD > 1 − pN .
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D’s expected payoff given T , when D restores electoral institutions, is

E(W

D∗

T −1
X
|T ) = E
δ t uD (a) + (Eδ T )Z B
t=0



1 − δ T −1
= uD (0) E
+ (Eδ T )Z B .
1−δ

Similarly, when D maintains subverted institutions given T ′ , the expected payoff is


′
1 − δ T −1
′
+ (Eδ T )Z B .
E(Z |T ) = uD (0) E
1−δ
D

′

Each of these expressions is a weighted sum between the uD (0) term and the common
′

constant Z B . I then need to compare the expectations of the terms Eδ T and Eδ T . Both
T and T ′ are distributed negative binomial such that: T ∼ N B(r = 1, p = 1 − pN ) and
T ′ ∼ N B(r = 1, p = 1 − pD ). The general PMF for a negative binomial variable k where k is
the number of successes and r = 1 is the number of failures until the institutions revert to
the subverted state is:


P(K = k) =


k+r−1
(1 − p)r pk .
k

Substituting the parameter values for T :
 
k
P(T = k) =
(pN )(1 − pN )k = (pN )(1 − pN )k .
k
Thus the expectation of δ T is
T

Eδ =

∞
X

δ k (pN )(1 − pN )k =

k=0
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pN
,
1 − δ(1 − pN )

(3.1)

and similarly
′

Eδ T =

pD
.
1 − δ(1 − pD )

(3.2)

I set (4) greater that (5) to verify which expectation is greater:
pD
pN
>
1 − δ(1 − pN )
1 − δ(1 − pD )
To verify this, I cross multiply and cancel common terms:

pN (1 − δ(1 − pD )) > pD (1 − δ(1 − pN ))

pN > pD .

′

Therefore Eδ T < Eδ T , and since the weight on the more preferred uD (0) term — which
′

is better than Z B because uD (0) = 0 and Z B < 0 — is higher when Eδ T is lower, the
expected payoff for Z D is higher than W D∗ . That is, for all parameter values, W D∗ < Z D , so
in the absence of durability, institutional restoration of elections is never preferable. Now, to
prove restoring executive constraints is never preferable. I look at Y D∗ , which benefits from
T ′ , but implements the policy a:

E(Y

D∗



′
1 − δ T −1
′
|T ) = uD (a) E
+ (Eδ T )Z B .
1−δ
′

In this case, the weight on the uD (·) term is the same between the two cases Z D and
Y D∗ , but the uD (·) term is higher in Z D than in Y D∗ and the same weights are on the
shared, negative Z B term. Because uD (0) > uD (a) because uD (0) = 0 and uD (a) < 0, the
expected payoff for Z D is higher than Y D∗ . So, for all parameter values, Y D∗ < Z D , and
institutional restoration of executive constraints is never preferable. Finally, when combining
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both executive and electoral restoration in V D∗ , D is worse off for both sets of institutions
compared to Z D :

E(V

D∗



1 − δ T −1
|T ) = uD (a) E
+ (Eδ T )Z B
1−δ

In this case, D is giving up both the advantage in winning probability that comes from
T ′ and the better policy outcome that comes from uD (0). This means that both the uD (·)
′

term is better in Z D , but also the weight on the term is higher because Eδ T < Eδ T . So, the
expected payoff for Z D is higher than V D∗ . So finally, for all parameter values, V D∗ < Z D ,
so in the absence of durability, institutional restoration of elections and executive constraints
is never preferable. This means that for any combination of restored institutions, D is worse
off than it would be maintaining subverted institutions.

Proposition 3 (Reforming when restoration is never durable) When restoration is
not durable, there is no combination of parameters where D prefers to restore any institutions.

Proposition 3 states that for any combination of non-durable restorative measures, D is
strictly worse off engaging in restorative measures. This result for non-durable institutions
is useful as a fringe case, but while it is likely that B will not want to abide by the new
restorative measures D can passes, it is unlikely that trampling existing institutions for a
second time would go without consequences. To complement the non-durable case, in the
next section I rigorously explore when restorative measures are completely durable and the
different parameter configurations that produce preferences for or against restoration.
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3.6

When Restoration is Durable

When restorative measures are durable, there is no guarantee that restoration is always
disadvantageous. Under durable restorative measures, B can never revert to backsliding so
it plays by the rules set by D in perpetuity. This scenario is the most optimistic setting
where any restorative measures are certain to hold and should be a “high water mark” for
the prospects of restoration. In order to assess choice under durable restorative measures, I
first need to re-write the continuation values in terms of the parameters in order to compare
across the different institutional combinations. I do this using the values from table 3.1 and I
solve for each continuation value as follows: for V D , (1) solve V D in terms of V B , (2) solve
V B in terms of V D , (3) substitute solution of (2) into (1) and solve for V D . This produces a
solution for the continuation value V D using only parameters:

VD =

uD (a)(1 − δpN ) + δpN uD (b)
1−δ

A similar process for the other continuation values yields:

WD =

uD (0)(1 − δpN ) + δpN uD (c)
1−δ

YD =

uD (a)(1 − δpB ) + δpD uD (b)
(1 − δ)(1 − δpB + δpD )

ZD =

uD (0)(1 − δpB ) + δpD uD (c)
(1 − δ)(1 − δpB + δpD )

Using these values, I can analyze the factors that would determine the best choice for
the successor. The comparisons that I focus my analysis on are: V D > W D , V D > Y D ,
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W D > Z D , and Y D > Z D . I do not consider V D > Z D because it is too complicated to solve
directly, but I can leverage the transitive application of conditions to get at this. Consider
that if V D > W D and W D > Z D or V D > Y D and Y D > Z D are true, then we can state
V D > Z D , though these are only sufficient conditions. I show the substantive interpretation
for each of these comparisons in table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Conditions to Solve for Nash Reversion and Interpretation
Notation
V D > WD
VD >YD
W D > ZD
Y D > ZD

Interpretation
When only executive institutions have been compromised,
D is better off restoring executive constraints than not.
When only electoral institutions have been compromised,
D is better off restoring free and fair elections than not.
When both sets of institutions have been compromised,
D is better off only restoring free and fair elections than not.
When both sets of institutions have been compromised,
D is better off only restoring executive constraints than not.

I then solve each of these expressions for a common parameter: the discount factor δ.
For each set of inequalities, I simplified when possible, and solved for delta. For example, in
the case of W D > Z D , I began with the following inequality:

uD (0)(1 − δpN ) + δpN uD (c)
uD (0)(1 − δpB ) + δpD uD (c)
>
1−δ
(1 − δ)(1 − δpB + δpD )
On the left hand side is the continuation value when only executive constraints were
restored, and on the right hand side the continuation value when neither set of institutions
was restored. Significant algebra is needed to solve for δ and simplify, but I repeated this
process for the other inequalities. I specifically solve for δ because it is present in all of the
inequalities of interest and it can be solved for for the purpose of doing comparative statics.
No other parameter had both of these properties. An alternative way to interpret δ is the
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level of urgency at the beginning of D’s term, where a low level of δ shows a high level of
focus on short-term goals as opposed to long-term impacts.
I approach the equilibrium in terms of Nash reversion, or the best choice for D looking
forward regardless of the history of the game. In the case of V D > W D for instance, electoral
restoration took place previously, but that history is not important in D’s decision. I simplified
these expressions to create cut-offs and plugged-in the parameters a, b, and c into the uD (X)
equation to solve for a critical discount factor: δ ∗ , where when the discount factor is at
or above this level, restoration is preferred. As δ ∗ increases, the corresponding restoration
condition is harder to satisfy.

Lemma 3 (Successor Cutoffs for Preferring Restoring Institutions) The critical discount factor threshold, δ ≥ δ ∗ , in which successors prefer restoring institutions, for each
choice of interest is:

i. V D > W D :

δ∗ =

ii. V D > Y D :

δ∗ =

iii. W D > Z D :

δ∗ =

iv. Y D > Z D :

δ∗ =

a2
pN (a2 −b2 +c2 )
pN −pD
pN (pB −pD )
pN −pD
pN (pB −pD )
a2
pB a2 +pD (c2 −b2 )

I use the thresholds from lemma 3 to analyze how different parameters impact the
position of the threshold, and identify when it is within the range of (0, 1) so restoration
can be the preferred path. For each set of results, I take the partial derivatives of each of δ ∗
with respect to my parameter of interest. In both V D > W D and Y D > Z D , D is considering
whether or not to restore executive constraints, but in one of these cases electoral institutions
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remain subverted (Y D > Z D ). Unlike the decision to restore executive constraints, δ ∗ is the
same for both V D > Y D and Y D > Z D , because the policies (0, a, b, c) cancel out. I consider
how these equations differ in each of the sets of results. These results can be interpreted
in terms of the parameter regions in which restoration is or is not preferred and how these
parameters regions grow or shrink depending on δ and the parameters of interest.
The parameters of interest for each of the three sets of results are divided into the
magnitude of the subverted institutions for both kinds of backsliding, and finally electoral
safety. The magnitude of subverted executive constraints is measured by c or the policy that
B implements absent executive constraints. I refer to this as the polarization parameter in my
results. The more polarized the two parties, the greater the potential policy penalty when out
of power. I assume that without executive constraints, a party implements that bliss point.
As that bliss point becomes more extreme, I expect that it will require additional subversion
of executive constraints. The extent of electoral manipulation is measured by the subversion
advantage, pB − pD , or the difference between B’s probability of victory when in power
minus the probability of victory for B when D is in power. Finally, I assess electoral safety,
represented by pN or the probability of B’s victory absent electoral subversion regardless
of the office holder. For the results for each of these parameters of interest, I graphically
represent the various δ ∗ curves. In these accompanying figures to the main results, I alter
various parameters to provide additional understanding of how various factors interact and
impact preferences for restoration.

3.6.1

Polarization and Restoration

When D considers whether or not to restore executive constraints, the parameter of interest
is c or the polarization between the two parties when the executive is unconstrained. In this
case, the magnitude of executive subversion is reliant on whether policy will bounce between
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an inner constrained range of [a, b] or the unconstrained [0, c]. When holding the inner range
fixed, the larger the second range, the greater risk for maintaining the damaged institutions.
In order to assess the role of the size of executive subversion on restoration preferences, I
take the δ ∗ from Lemma 3 for both V D > W D and Y D > Z D . In V D > W D elections are
free and fair regardless, and in Y D > Z D elections are subverted regardless. I take the partial
derivative of these δ ∗ with respect to c to get the results for Proposition 4.

Proposition 4 (Polarization and Restoring Executive Constraints) The critical discount factor needed for a successor to prefer restoring executive constraints is decreasing in
the polarization parameter, c.

In other words, higher levels of polarization require a lower discount factor to induce the
democratic restoration of executive constraints. This result is true both when election are
restored or not. In terms of the parameter space, a higher level of polarization produces a
larger region where restoration is preferred. This means that higher polarization makes it less
worthwhile to maintain executive aggrandizement and this is true regardless of the size and
position of inner range of b and c, though these values will effect the position the threshold
itself. The risk of more polarized outcomes can be an effective deterrent to maintaining
executive aggrandizement when the choice of D is durable.
While proposition 4 is helpful for evaluating polarization, there are other parameters
that can affect this relationship. I am specifically interested in the impact of the electoral
institutions or pN when elections are free and fair and pB and pD when elections are subverted.
In each of those cases, I am also interested in the inner range of policy when the executive is
constrained [a, b], and its position relative to c. I first consider D’s preferences when elections
are not subverted (V D > W D ) and then consider the choice when elections are subverted
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(Y D > Z D ). I plot the δ ∗ curves and alter the parameters of interest to show how the different
parameters varying together impacts preferences for restoration.
Figure 3.1: The Effect of Electoral Safety (1 − pN ) on the δ and c Combinations Where D
Favors Restoration.
A.

B.
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Note: δ ∗ curves for D’s choice to restore executive constraints when electoral subversion has already been
restored (V D > W D ). In both panels I manipulate the electoral safety (1 − pN ) of D. In this case, the higher
safety numbers mean a lower probability of D winning election. In panel A , the inner range of policy under
a constrained executive is smaller (a = 0.4 and b = 0.6). In panel B, I expand this inner range (a = 0.2 and
b = 0.8).

In figure 3.1 I show the impact of electoral safety (1 − pN ) on polarization and the
choice to restore executive constraints. As pN increases, D’s electoral prospects are worse. In
panel A, I show the impact of electoral safety with a narrow range of constrained policies
if executive constraints are restored (small range of a and b) and in panel B I show how
those same values of 1 − pN impact the curves with a larger range of constrained policies. As
electoral safety decreases, the region where restoration is preferred grows larger, and this is
especially the case when the executive constraints allow a wider range of policies. In both
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panels, when c = 1, the constrained range of policies — [a, b] — is not biased in favor of
either party relative to their bliss points. However, when c > 1, executive constraints are
biased in favor of D, and when c < 1, executive constraints are biased in favor of B. Because
it is unlikely that B would have removed executive constraints that benefited it, and rising
polarization is a defining characteristic of the backsliding literature (Graham and Svolik
2020), it is more useful reference the portion of the figure where c > 1.
Figure 3.2: The Effect of Executive Constraints (a and b) on the δ and c Combinations Where
D Favors Restoration.
A.
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Note: δ ∗ curves for D’s choice to restore executive constraints when electoral subversion has already been
restored (V D > W D ). In both panels I explore the inner range of constraints against the executive (a and b).
In panel A I show the impact of increasing the size of this internal range. In Panel b I show the impact of
“tilting” the range in favor of either D or B. In both panels I fix pN = 0.5.

In figure 3.2 I show the impact of altering the range of acceptable policies (a and b)
when executive constraints are restored. In panel A, I progressively expand the range of
acceptable policies when the executive is constrained. Similar to above, when c = 1, the
85

range is not biased in favor of either party relative to their bliss points. As this range grows
larger, so does the region where restoration is preferred and this is most observable when
c > 1. In panel B, I explore when the inner range is “tilted” for or against one of D or B. In
this case, the more tilted the constrained institutions are in favor of D, the larger the region
where D prefers restoring. The converse is true for when institutions are “tilted” in favor of
B. When I consider the impact of executive constraints on the choice to restore executive
constraints when electoral institutions are subverted regardless (Y D > Z D ), the results are
largely similar15 .
Figure 3.3: The Effect of Damaged Electoral Institutions (pD and pB ) on the δ and c
Combinations where D Favors Restoration.
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Note: δ ∗ curves for D’s choice to restore executive constraints when electoral subversion is present (Y D > Z D ).
In panel A I show the impact of increasing the size of the subversion advantage (pB − pD ) when symmetrical
around 0.5. In panel B I show the impact of “tilting” damaged electoral institutions in favor or against D. In
both panels I fix a = 0.4 and b = 0.6.
15

There are minor differences driven by the short-term benefit D has in retaining office with probability
pD − 1 instead of pN − 1, but because these figures are mostly the same, I exclude them here.

86

Lastly, I consider the choice to restore executive constraints when electoral institutions
are subverted (Y D > Z D ). In figure 3.3, I assess the impact of damaged electoral institutions
(pD and pB ) on the choice to restore executive constraints. In panel A, I show the impact
of the size of the subversion advantage (pB − pD ) on the preference to restore democratic
institutions. The larger the subversion advantage, the larger the difference in outcomes
when in power and out of power. As the subversion advantage decreases, the region where
restoration of executive institutions is preferred grows larger. This is mostly driven by the
probability that B can win while D is in power (pD ). When this value is very low, as it is the
larger the subversion advantage, the the risk of B winning and instituting an extreme policy
(c) is also low. Conversely, as the subversion advantage shrinks, the threat of the extreme
policy rises and the region where restoration is preferred expands.
In panel B, I hold the subversion advantage constant and consider “tilted” electoral
institutions. In this case, the more tilted the institutions are to D, the smaller the region
where restoration is preferred. In practice, this unlikely because B would not have an incentive
to damage electoral institutions in a way to benefit D. Instead, it is more helpful to consider
the δ ∗ curves where the damaged electoral institutions are tilted in favor of B. Even when
the inner range of policies is skewed in favor of B, as it is when c < 1, there are incentives
for D to restore executive constraints when electoral institutions are biased against it.
The effect of polarization on the preference to restore executive constraints can be altered
by electoral rules or the constraints themselves, but is a positive relationship regardless. A
successor can even settle for unappealing constrained executive institutions if the initial
backslider is especially extreme. Consider two sets of competing parties: one highly polarized
set, and another set with moderate polarization. Restoration is more likely to benefit a
successor in the highly polarized case because even a sub-optimal set of executive constraints
would be much more preferred than the alternative of wild swings in policy depending on
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the leader. Under more moderate polarization, the risk is not as great, so the executive
constraints may be there to stay. These results are important for the policy considerations
of a successor and restoring executive constraints, because retaining damaged executive
institutions can be a disadvantageous choice under some conditions. Next, I consider the
restoration of electoral institutions.

3.6.2

Electoral Institutions and the Subversion Advantage

Next, I evaluate the choice to restore free and fair elections and how the subversion advantage
(pB − pD ) impacts this choice. When the subversion advantage is high, it means that while
in power, D benefits from especially favorable electoral institutions (pD ), but when out of
power, the punishment is more severe (pB ). This additional level of risk is important to
consider when the alternative is the fixed value pN that exists within the range of (pD , pB )
and is reliable and more moderate. Unlike the previous proposition, the two δ ∗ equations
from lemma 3 where D considers restoring fair electoral institutions are identical. Also unlike
the results from the previous proposition, where the subversion advantage interacted with
polarization to increase preferences for restoration of executive constraints, polarization has
no impact on restoring electoral institutions. I take the partial derivative of this shared δ ∗
with respect to pB − pD to get the results for the subversion advantage.

Proposition 5 (The Subversion Advantage and Restoring Electoral Institutions)
The critical discount factor needed for a successor to prefer restoring free and fair elections is
decreasing in the subversion advantage, pB − pD .
Similar to the polarization result, the larger the magnitude of electoral subversion, the
lower the discount factor needed to prefer restoring free and fair elections. In other words, as
the subversion advantage increases, the region where restoration is preferred grows larger.
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When the magnitude of the subversion advantage is higher, the potential risk is also higher
and the successor increasingly prefers to restore free and fair elections. Next, I consider how
the component parts of the subversion advantage (pD and pB ) and its alternative (pN ) impact
the δ ∗ curves and the regions where D prefers to restore electoral institutions.
Figure 3.4: The Effect of Electoral Institutions (pD and pN ) on the δ and pB −pD Combinations
Where D Favors Restoration.
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Note: δ ∗ curves for D’s choice to restore electoral institutions regardless of executive constraint restoration
(V D > Y D and W D > Z D ). In panel A I show the impact of increasing the size of the subversion advantage
(pB − pD ) when symmetrical around 0.5. In panel B I show the impact of “tilting” damaged electoral
institutions in favor or against D while maintaining pN − pD = 0.1. In both panels I fix a = 0.4 and b = 0.6.
In both panels, beyond the right-bound of each curve, there are no parameter space for that given curve.

In figure 3.4, I consider the impact of the probability B wins when D is in power (pD )
and the probability B wins under free and fair elections (pN )16 . In panel A, I fix electoral
safety to a “fair” level (pN = 0.5) and explore how progressively better odds for D’s re-election
16

Because I vary the subversion advantage in one of the axes and fix the value of pD , the value of pB
changes depending on the size of the subversion advantage.
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when in office (pD ) and subversion advantage (pB − pD ) impact the preference to restore
electoral institutions. The length and position of the δ ∗ curves are different because as pD
decreases, the potential range of the subversion advantage decreases. These curves show that
the better the odds for D when in control of subverted institutions (smaller pD ), the smaller
the region where restoration is preferred.
The left and right bound of each of the δ ∗ curves as they appear are also important
reference points to interpret the results. First, the left bound, where the curve intersects with
δ = 1, is the value of of the subversion advantage when the subverted institutions are not
biased in favor of either party. Beyond this point, lower subversion advantages mean that
the subverted institutions are biased in D’s favor, so there is no scenario where D restores
electoral institutions. These values of the subversion advantage are unlikely, because the
institutions were subverted by and are likely skewed in favor of B. Second, the right bound
of the curve is the highest possible value of the subversion advantage given pD , or when pB
approaches 1. In this case, even if D knows that it will never win again after the first time B
gains power, the short term benefit of maintaining power can be high enough that D will not
restore. Because this is an extreme case, this is where D is most likely to restore. However,
with a sufficiently low level pD , perhaps in a country where the government has significant
controls of elections, restoration may not be the best choice unless D is focused more on
long-term impacts as opposed to short-term gains.
In panel B, I vary the restored electoral institutions (pN ) and the subverted institutions
when D is in power (pD ) to show the impact of tilted institutions when electoral safety varies.
The black curve in panel B is identical to the yellow-orange curve in panel A, and helps show
the impact altering the two sets of institutions together on the choice of restoring electoral
institutions. As both subverted and restored institutions are more biased against D, the
region where restoration is preferred grows. In each δ ∗ curve, when the subversion advantage
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is equal to 0.2, the subverted institutions are not biased to either party relative to the baseline
probability under restored institutions. In the two δ ∗ curves where the subverted electoral
institutions are biased towards D (the red and blue curves), there is no possible value of δ
for restoration to be preferred. Therefore, both the degree of tilt of the subversion advantage
relative to electoral safety (pN ) and the bias of electoral safety itself impacts preferences for
restoration of electoral institutions.
When combining the results on restoring electoral institutions together, the impact of
damaged and undamaged institutions is just as important as any biases they contain. Election
subversion likely will never favor the successor and this substantially impacts preferences
to restore these institutions. Consider the cases of electoral manipulation where parties
or candidates are banned or groups of people are disenfranchised like the case of Kurdish
voters in Turkey. It would be difficult for a successor to symmetrically wield those powers
against the other side, so subverted institutions will very likely be tilted in favor of the initial
backslider. Therefore, in cases like these, successors should be very likely to restore electoral
institutions when those actions cannot be easily undone. Next, I conclude the results with
the findings for electoral safety.

3.6.3

Electoral Safety and Restoration

Lastly, I explore the impact of the electoral safety under free and fair elections (1 − pN ), on
D’s incentive to restore both sets of institutions. I represent these results in terms of pN ,
where when pN is lower, D has a higher level of electoral safety. I look to three of the δ ∗
equations from lemma 3 to assess the impact of electoral safety on restoration preferences.
For restoring executive constraints, I select the choice to restore executive constrains when
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elections are free and fair (V D > W D )17 . For restoring subverted electoral institutions, I look
to both instances where electoral institutions can be restored (V D > Y D and W D > Z D ).

Proposition 6 (Electoral Safety and Restoration Preferences) The critical discount
factor needed for a successor to prefer restoring democratic institutions is:

i. decreasing in pN for executive constraints (V D > W D )
ii. increasing in pN for electoral institutions (V D > Y D and W D > Z D )18

In other words, as the successor has less electoral safety (higher pN and lower 1 − pN ),
the discount factor required to prefer restoration is decreasing for executive constraints, but
increasing for electoral institutions. In other words, as safety becomes lower, the region where
restoring executive constraints is preferred expands, but the region where restoring free and
fair elections is preferred shrinks. This naturally follows the understanding of the structure
of the two kinds of backsliding. For the first part, when D increasingly does not anticipate
winning elections in the future, it knows that placing an upward bound on its opponent’s
policy when they are out of power is more attractive. This is a policy motivated decision
that leads to the preference to restore executive constraints. Alternatively, when subverted
elections are in play, as electoral safety drops, D has increasingly less to lose and would prefer
a moderate bump in their chances when in power (pD ) over a comparatively more minimal
disadvantage when out of power (pB ).
Similar to the previous two propositions, I graphically represent how the parameters
explored so far, namely the magnitude of subverted institutions bias for each set of backsliding
I do not look at the remaining case (Y D > Z D ) because there are never free and fair elections so pN is
not a relevant parameter.
18
Alternatively, when restating for electoral safety (1−pN ): (1) Increasing in 1−pN for executive constraints
(V D > W D ) and (2) Decreasing in 1 − pN for electoral institutions (V D > Y D and W D > Z D ).
17
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actions, impact these results. For the choice to restore executive constraints, I explore altering
first polarization and then the constrained executive institutions. For the choice to restore
electoral institutions I show the impact of the bias and size of the subversion advantage.
Figure 3.5: The Effect of Polarization (c) on the δ and 1 − pN Combinations Where D Favors
Restoration.
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Note: δ ∗ curves for D’s choice to restore executive constraints when electoral subversion has already been
restored (V D > W D ). In panels A and B I show the impact of increasing the polarization parameter c. In
panel A, I set a narrow range of constrained policies a = 0.4 and b = 0.6. In Panel B, I set a wider range of
constrained policies a = 0.2 and b = 0.8.

Figure 3.5 shows how polarization and electoral safety (1 − pN ) jointly affect preferences
for restoring executive constraints. In panels A and B, I show that as polarization increases,
the region where restoration is preferred grows. In panel A, I set a narrow range of constrained
policies while in panel B I set a wider range. As polarization rises, the constrained range of
policies is more biased in favor of D, but this effect is more influential for the δ ∗ curves is when
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electoral safety is high, otherwise, as electoral safety decreases, the impact of polarization is
smaller because the region where restoration is preferred is already large.
Figure 3.6: The Effect of Executive Constraints (a and b) on the δ and 1 − pN Combinations
Where D Favors Restoration.
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Note: δ ∗ curves for D’s choice to restore executive constraints when electoral subversion has already been
restored (V D > W D ). In panel A I show the impact of increasing the constrained range of policies symmetric
around c/2 where c = 1. In panel B I explore a tilted range of constrained institutions with a fixed range of
b − a = 0.4 and where polarization is fixed to c = 1.

In figure 3.6 I consider the size and bias of the executive constraints as they relate to
electoral safety and the preference for restoring those constraints. In panel A, the size of the
executive constraints are altered or the range of a and b is increased with fixed polarization.
As this range expands, so does the region where restoration is preferred. The magnitude of
the executive constraints is most influential when electoral safety is high, because the risk of
a higher of value of B’s constrained policy is much lower than the benefit of a lower value
of D’s constrained policy. In panel B, the size of the executive constraints is fixed, but its
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bias is altered. In this case, the blue line in panel A is the same as the black line in panel B.
As executive constraints are more biased to D, the region where restoration is preferred is
unsurprisingly larger. Meanwhile, D will prefer restoring less when executive constraints are
biased to B, which is an unlikely world because B likely would not have removed executive
constraints in the first place. Ultimately, these results are interesting because more modest
restorative measures are much more preferred than more severe restorative measures.
Figure 3.7: The Effect of the Subversion Advantage (pB −pD ) on the δ and 1−pN Combinations
Where D Favors Restoration.
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Note: δ ∗ curves for D’s choice to restore electoral institutions regardless of executive constraint restoration
(V D > Y D and W D > Z D ). In panel A I show the impact of increasing the size of the subversion advantage
(pB − pD ) when symmetrical around 1 − pN = 0.5. In panel B I show the impact of “tilting” damaged electoral
institutions in favor or against D. In both panels I fix a = 0.4 and b = 0.6.

Lastly, in figure 3.7, I show the impact of the size and position of the subversion advantage
(pB − pD ) on electoral safety (1 − pN ) and the preference to restore electoral institutions. In
panel A, I alter the size of the subversion advantage so the range of possible 1 − pN increases
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with the subversion advantage19 . As the subversion advantage increases, so does the region
where restoration of electoral institutions is not preferred. In other words, when D has
especially favorable institutions today (low pD or high 1 − pD ), it is less likely to restore,
especially when electoral safety is not high. In each δ ∗ curve, as electoral safety increases, the
preference for restoration increases. In panel B, the subversion advantage is fixed, and I shift
the subverted institutions to be biased for or against D. In this panel, 1 − pN can only take
a value between 1 − pD and 1 − pB , so the curves begin and end in different locations. The
more biased the institutions are against D (lower 1 − pD and 1 − pB ), the larger the region
where restoration is preferred. Also, as institutions are more biased in favor D, the more
δ ∗ > 1 which δ can never meet, so restoration is never preferred in those cases.
While the results for electoral safety are driven by the nature of the two sets of institutions,
they provide some interesting competing incentives for successors that consider whether to
restore. If greater electoral safety makes restoration more likely for one set of institutions
than another, then it is easier to imagine a scenario where one set of institutions is restored
for one purpose and another is not restored for a different reason. These results are interesting
in light of the findings from the previous two propositions as well because they help detail the
case where sometimes restoration of one set of institutions is highly preferred, which in other
cases, restoration may not produce beneficial outcomes. While these results are in light of
durable restorative measures, that also provide useful context to the more likely case where
durability is not ironclad. I discuss this along with the main implications from the formal
model in the next section.
19

Where pB and pD are symmetric around 1 − pN when 1 − pN = 0.5.
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3.7

Semi-Durability: Limitations and Discussion

Now that I have systematically explored how the three main factors that I theorize impact a
successor’s choice to restore elections — durability, the magnitude of subversion, and electoral
safety — and how they relate to each other and combine to produce similar or competing
incentives, I will discuss two of the main limitations of the model. First, it is unlikely
that restorative measures are either completely durable or completely not durable. But, by
analyzing these two fringe cases — the optimistic case of completely durable restorative
measures and the pessimistic case of completely non-durable restoration — I can say more
about the likely world where restored institutions are “sticky,” but not ironclad. The second
is that even if restoration is preferred it may not always be possible. If not all institutions
can be fully restored, more modest instances of restoration can be made to stem the tide
of backsliding. Before concluding, I discuss these two limitations in terms of the model and
the implications of this research on our understanding of what happens after a backslider is
removed in the real world.
In terms of the model, when considering some level of durability between the two extreme
cases of completely durable and completely non-durable, I would expect that the δ ∗ curves
would shift up as restorative measures become less durable. In any of the figures, suppose that
the backslider B could re-damage institutions with some probability π when B re-gains power.
As π increases, I expect that the δ ∗ ’s would shift higher within the parameter space of each
figure. As this occurs, there will be less of the δ ∗ ’s in a position where a value of δ can satisfy
a preference for restoration. To address the limitation that restorative measures may be
costly, consider that there is some cost to restore institutions for D. I assume that given some
cost for restorative measures, this would impact δ ∗ in a similar way, by shifting the curves
up and reducing the possible number of values of δ where D prefers restoration. I expect
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that extreme subversion, there should still be some values of δ possible where restoration is
preferred, even if those actions are costly.
While a general concern of restoring institutions is constraining one’s actions only to
have the other side not live by those same constraints, institutional changes should not
be so fragile. Assuming some fragility, there are still cases where restoration is preferable.
Consider out-parties in Turkey, Hungary and Poland. In Turkey for instance, the opposition
party (CHP) is heavily constrained by the size of the governing party (AKP). Should it gain
power and attempt to walk back some of the backsliding measures of Erdoğan, it likely will
enter office with low electoral safety, probably having won in a close election with factors
dramatically in its favor. In this case, constraining the executive may be beneficial even if
the CHP expects the AKP may undo the restorative measures after re-taking power. In
Poland and Hungary, where electoral institutions are more clearly biased in favor of the ruling
parties, even if opposition parties gained power they likely could not wield the institutions
significantly to their benefit, so similar incentives may exist for restoring electoral institutions.
In the recent case of the United States, President Biden, who won despite institutions biased
against his party, has shown resistance in engaging in the same executive over-reach of his
predecessor and resisting calls to retaliate (Beals 2022), but has explored reform of elections,
judges, and the civil service. In this case, the other limitation is especially noteworthy.
Unlike in the model, some restorative measures are not always possible. In the American
case, even if Democrats wanted to restore electoral institutions, most of the bias of these
institutions is enacted at the state level and not the federal level. Gerrymandering in drawing
of districts for the House of Representatives, strict voter ID laws, and alarming new efforts to
propose alternative slates of electors after Presidential elections are three examples of efforts
at the state level to tip the scales at the national level and are not able to be neatly fixed by
a new administration of Democrats. Instead, restorative measures may take time and happen
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over several terms in office. Despite existing institutional durability, the fundamentals of the
model remain relevant for these choices because even if restorative measures are not absolute,
they can have more modest benefits that follow the general relationships in the result section.
Ultimately, while the model has some limitations for the real world, such as the nature of
institutional restoration being not durable enough or existing institutions being too durable,
it can tell us a lot about expectations for restoration and the conditions under which we
should most and least expect to see it. Even expectations of more minor restorative actions
or retaliatory measures are useful theoretical innovations that can inform and shape this new
frontier in the literature.

3.8

Conclusion

Understanding both how backsliding either persists or is reversed is a natural, yet unstudied
extension of the backsliding literature. While existing democratization literature provides
several useful points of departure such as the focus of risk aversion of new leaders, backsliding
regimes are notably different, because they still possess democratic norms and institutions,
even if they were left in a state of disrepair.
I argued that the main factors that impact whether successors to backsliders pursue
restoration of democratic institutions are the durability of restorative measures, the magnitude
of subverted institutions, and electoral safety. Durability is the most important factor for
restoration because absent durability, there are no incentives to restore if the other side
will not follow the same constrained rules. Given some level of durability though, there are
situations where restorative measures are preferred even if the confidence in a future backslider
playing by the new rules is not certain. The magnitude of subversion both institutions is
also important, and when this grows larger, so do the preferences for restoration for each
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set of institutions. Lastly, electoral safety impacts preferences for restoration differently
depending on the nature of the institutions being reformed. While higher electoral safety
leads to higher preferences for restoring electoral institutions, it leads to lower preferences for
restoring executive constraints. These main results, along with the systematic analysis of
how these various factors interact, provide a full model detailing preferences for restoration.
Future work can build on this theoretical contribution by exploring some of the smaller
conclusions using observational data. While many factors of the model are difficult to
adequately estimate, analyzing some macro-level considerations for successors to backsliders
and observing the actions they take may provide some useful findings for how this theoretical
model holds up under real world conditions. The focus on establishing this formal model
and the intensive theoretical analysis in the results sections provided several interesting
conclusions about preferences for restoration such as restoration being preferred in situations
where a successor may not immediately benefit from the new rules due to biased institutions.
These results, both major and minor, are some of the first contributions to answer a question
that will only continue to be more important in the backsliding literature and political science
as a whole.
This study shows that democracy may still be imperiled even when a more democratic
government succeeds a backsliding one. This has implications for both when the opposition
to either the AKP in Turkey, the PiS in Poland, or Fidesz in Hungary returns to power,
and also the choice of the current Biden administration in the wake of backsliding under
the Trump administration. If the succeeding government prioritizes policy by retaliating
against the initial backslider and neglects to meaningfully restore and repair democratic
norms and institutions, then a tit-for-tat cycle of backsliding may lead to complete democratic
failure. This study is important because when voters opt for democratic alternatives to their
backsliding leaders, there may be a narrow window of time to repair democratic institutions
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to serve as a bulwark against future backsliding. Understanding this new set of incentives
will allow political scientists and policy makers to better understand the most productive
priorities for the long-term democratic health of a country. In the next chapter I shift my
focus to voters and their preferences for their leaders should they succeed a backsliding
incumbent, and under what conditions they prefer a restoring successor or a retaliator.
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Chapter 4
Retaliation or Reformation: Voters’
Democratic Preferences After Democratic
Backsliding

4.1

Introduction

How does backsliding affect voters’ preference for democratic institutions? Are voters more
likely to support backsliding from co-partisans if the opposition engaged in democratic
backsliding first? The literature around voters’ support of leaders engaging in democratic
backsliding is relatively new, but less focus has been placed on voters’ preferences for
maintaining democracy. While past explanations of voter support have focused on partisanship,
polarization, and the role of societal threat (Chapter 2), democratic preferences themselves
are often taken as given and are understudied. The focus on supporters of initial backsliders
is useful, but considering how detractors will act when they regain power is an important
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extension and can give greater insight about the long-term democratic health of a country. If
the opposition prefers to retaliate against the initial backslider instead of repairing institutions
to prevent future democratic subversion, then a long term pattern of tit-for-tat retaliation
can eventually yield a full authoritarian reversion.
When a backsliding incumbent yields to a successor formerly in the opposition, there
is uncertainty about the path forward: democratic restoration or continued democratic
backsliding either by maintaining damaged institutions or damaging them further. While
the focus of the backsliding literature on voters is commonly focused on their tolerance of
backsliding, considering what happens when a successor is chosen is noteworthy. In Chapter
3, I explored when the former opposition regains control and the choice to either continue
to use the damaged institutions to retaliate or to repair them to prevent future misuse. It
is additionally important to explore how voters view these choices and how that impacts
the prospects for democracy after the backslider is removed. In the American context, the
literature on constitutional qualms (Christenson and Kriner 2017a; Reeves and Rogowski
2018) provides some competing expectations of the permissiveness of co-partisans to actions
that approach backsliding. In the literature on constitutional hardball (Fishkin and Pozen
2018; Helmke, Kroeger, and Paine 2019; Pozen 2018; Shugerman 2019), incentives to push
democratic limits can lead to a breakdown in the mutual deterrence that maintains democracy.
The practice of retaliatory hardball is a key area where the retaliation or restoration choice
can be made, and a democratic breakdown can occur after too many retaliatory actions.
I argue that the trade-off between policy and democratic preferences is fundamental for
voters’ overall choice between retaliation or restoration. Generally, voters may or may not
react adversely to democratic backsliding if their own party is responsible. I expect that for
supporters of the out-party, if their leaders are able to push forward policy at the expense of
democratic norms and institutions when the party retakes power, the voters will generally
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approve, especially after backsliding. I also consider the counterfactual condition where an
incumbent did not engage in backsliding to compare with backsliding incumbents to show
how this trade-off changes. If voters only care about policy and not democratic governance,
we should expect little differentiation. If voters care about democratic norms at the expense
of policy, then they will prefer their successor behave more democratically to the detriment
of their policy goals. Additionally, if voters are sensitive to democratic norms but value
policy, they will prefer the more democratic path after a non-backsliding or minor backsliding
incumbent, but prefer retaliation after more severe backsliding. I expect these voters to be
sensitive to the severity of the backsliding employed.
To test the theory, I look to the United States: a country that both recently removed an
incumbent that engaged in backsliding and has a history of tit-for-tat constitutional hardball.
Further, the United States is a laboratory for exploring voter preferences for a successor to
an initial backslider as the choice between retaliation and restoration has dominated the
early days of the Biden Administration. The administration has signaled a desire to improve
weakened institutions, in line with restoration-minded preferences (Wise and Walsh 2021).
Simultaneously, some provisions of the robust policy program the administration campaigned
on were passed into law, but other components required executive action — an example of
minor backsliding because executive orders generally require some executive overreach on a
policy area that was not amenable under other means — outside of the normal legislative
process to enact key provisions due to considerable gridlock (Vazquez, Sullivan, and Klein
2022). Executive actions alone are also insufficient to enact the policy program because of
the prevalence of adversarial courts that can strike down statutes (Breuninger 2022; Liptak
2022). This would indicate that in order to pass the outlined agenda, there would either need
to be some backsliding action to capture the courts or eliminate gridlock. However, some of
the measures to counteract these forces remain divisive (Freeman 2021; Yokley 2022). These
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competing goals can provide an array of choices to politicians, but also directly involve voters.
If the base of the Democratic party prioritizes eliminating gridlock or changing courts via
backsliding measures to pursue policy change while they have unified control of government,
then this may create incentives for their leaders to pursue these goals beyond the incentives
established in the previous chapter. This recent history, along with a more established history
of constitutional hardball, make the United States an appropriate setting to gauge voter
preferences in a survey experiment.
In the survey experiment, I evaluate voters’ preferences after hypothetical backsliding by
the opposite-party. Specifically, I examine their preference between one of two same-party
candidates: a restorer who prefers a more democratic approach to governance at the expense
of full policy goals, or a retaliator who prefers pursuing policy reversals at the expense
of democratic institutions. Respondents make this choice after random assignment to an
incumbent who engaged in no backsliding, minor backsliding, or severe backsliding. I expect
that voters prefer the restorer over the retaliator more when the incumbent does not backslide
or engages in minor backsliding actions than when the incumbent enacts major backsliding.
Beyond the theoretical framework, I also test recent findings that Republicans are more
supportive of backsliding (Fishkin and Pozen 2018; Grumbach 2022; Mann and Ornstein 2016;
Shugerman 2019). I expect, because of this existing literature, that Republican respondents
across all categories to prefer retaliators when compared to Democratic respondents.
I find that the severity of backsliding impacts voters’ preferences for the retaliating
candidate. More extreme backsliding measures were met with higher retaliator support
than milder backsliding cases. Meanwhile, the control condition, where no backsliding was
enacted, produced unexpected results. These results may indicate that the choice for voters
after backsliding is distinct from initial support for backsliding, but not in the expected
direction. Respondents who were randomly assigned to an incumbent that did not backslide
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supported the retaliator more than those who were randomly assigned to the minor backsliding
incumbent, but less than those who were assigned the severe backslider. Lastly, contrary to
expectations, I found that Republicans were slightly less likely to support the retaliator.
This research is important to explore whether the removal of a backsliding incumbent
can help slow or stop the cycle of democratic backsliding, or if the success of one backslider
can create a series of tit-for-tat actions between rivaling factions that devolves into retaliatory
hardball. If one instance of backsliding leads to alternating parties operating on progressively
more fragile institutions, a full democratic breakdown can occur. This study isolates one
instance of the choice of a successor in this chain, but a series of retaliatory backsliding
actions can increase the threat to democracy because of the continued erosion of democratic
institutions and trust. Within this snapshot, I focus on voters’ behavior specifically because
of how politicians and elites get cues on what to prioritize, and vice versa. Therefore, this
chapter combined with Chapter 3 can provide greater understanding of the importance of the
narrow window where democratic resurgence after backsliding can occur. If voters are not
concerned about restoring democratic institutions after they are degraded, then this can be
another step along the path of retaliatory hardball and democratic backsliding. Consequently,
if leaders are incentivized by their supporters to subvert democracy in order to advance their
policy programs, and voters only care about democratic conduct when their politicians are
out of power, then these incentives may not bode well for electoral democracies experiencing
backsliding.

4.2

Background

The study of voter support for backsliding has predominately focused on when and why voters
support undemocratic candidates and backsliding incumbents. Little focus has been placed
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on how these opinions change after a backsliding government yields to a successor. This is
understandable given the limited instances of this change, but is normatively important to
consider when current backsliders are replaced. These events can be a crucial window to
restrain backsliding and stave off future back-and-forth hardball to prevent democratic failure.
I summarize existing arguments around voter support, and more narrowly, voters’ value of
democratic norms and institutions and how they are willing to bend given characteristics like
partisanship, polarization, and societal threat.
As I detailed in chapter 2, there is considerable debate around whether voters preferences
for democratic norms and institutions have fallen or not in recent years (Alexander and
Welzel 2017; Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017a,b; Norris 2017; Voeten 2016). Whereas other work
has approached these values alternatively by framing preferences as majoritarian or not
(Grossman et al. 2022). While the understanding of these preferences at the aggregate is
difficult to assess, it remains important to attempt to understand voters’ motivation as falling
support for democracy amongst voters makes the emergence of a backsliding actor more
probable (Huntington 1991).
Other work has taken these preferences as given, and explored the factors that makes
voters weight these preference more or less. Arguments around partisanship and polarization
(Graham and Svolik 2020; Mazepus and Toshkov 2022; Singer 2021; Svolik 2018) and the role
of societal threat that raises the stakes of elections and makes voters and elites risk averse
(Chapter 2) have served to show how even democratically-minded voters are willing to support
those who subvert democracy. In this work, voters are generally concerned about policy
chiefly, and preferences against backsliding actions secondarily. In this chapter, I explore
the role of an important policy goal and how it impacts an out-party voter’s willingness to
support a backsliding-minded candidate depending on whether the opposite-party incumbent
engaged in severe backsliding or not.
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In the American context, these same concepts, namely partisanship and polarization,
have also been found to provide support for unilateral actions of the executive (Christenson
and Kriner 2017a; Reeves and Rogowski 2015, 2016). When there are policy motivations for
stretching the range of acceptable actions, voters are more willing to approve of these actions
and look past their “constitutional qualms”. The evidence of voters’ willingness to overlook
constitutional misdeeds in favor of policy is a bit mixed (Reeves et al. 2017; Reeves and
Rogowski 2018), and I continue the exploration of that trade-off. While most of this work is
in the context of unilateral action of American presidents, I believe these same concepts are
relevant for backsliding actions more generally.
This same concept has been discussed in literature on “constitutional hardball” (Helmke,
Kroeger, and Paine 2019) with respect to the choice of elected leaders and their incentives
to push against constitutional boundaries, but not to break them. Constitutional hardball
generally speaks to challenging democracy at the margins, or minor backsliding actions used
for policy gains. These initial infractions lead to a series of retaliatory hardball measures that
have been a key feature in recent American politics (Fishkin and Pozen 2018; Pozen 2018;
Shugerman 2019). As these hardball actions get progressively more egregious, the likelihood
of more explicit backsliding actions rises. Constitutional hardball has been increasingly
associated with the Republican Party at the national (Fishkin and Pozen 2018; Shugerman
2019) and state level (Grumbach 2022). Meanwhile, at the voter level, there is evidence in
the United States that voters overestimate the willingness of members of the opposite party
to break norms and this drives support for norm breaking by their own party (Braley et al.
2021).
The existing literature provides useful context for understanding voters’ democratic norm
and institution preferences. Isolating how those preferences shift in the face of backsliding by
the opposite party is a useful extension to consider in the chain of retaliatory backsliding. I
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consider this more in the next section where I outline the theoretical framework for a voter’s
preferences for or against a candidate that pursues democratic subversion to enact policy
goals. Within this choice, I consider how the presence of existing backsliding and its severity
impact voters’ eventual choice. I explore the importance of the choice during the window
after democratic backsliding by isolating the events after a backslider’s removal. Voters may
prioritize policy and signal their leaders to continue a series of back-and-forth retaliatory
backsliding. Alternatively, they may prefer that some policy goals are sacrificed to enact
restorative measures to repair democracy. The contours of this choice at the voter level,
paired with the successor level (Chapter 3) can provide collective and competing expectations
for when backsliders are removed.

4.3

Theory

If a backslider leaves office and is replaced by the former opposition, the officeholder responds
with a key choice.20 To simplify for the purpose of the voter, the choice can be divided
between two general paths: restoration where the opposition focuses on repairing damaged
institutions, or retaliation where recently subverted norms and institutions are maintained or
damaged further. These choices also have direct consequences for the ability of the former
opposition to implement its preferred policies.
Under restoration, a democratic successor focuses on restoring the democratic norms
and institutions that were targeted by the backsliding predecessor. Examples of restoration
include introducing constraints on the executive, restoring civil service protections, and
making elections more free and fair21 . This path is normatively beneficial for the quality of
20

The focus of Chapter 3
Initial backsliders commonly attack and damage many of these institutions as counter-majoritarian, and
use that as justification to seize power. By doing this, these leaders eliminate constitutional constraints and
are able to later misuse those new powers in unadvertised ways (e.g., the 1999 constitution in Venezuela
was meant to streamline the legislative process but dramatically entrenched the new party, thus creating
21
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democracy, but has an important trade-off with policy. I assume that pursuing a restoration
route, especially restoring constraints on the executive, would come at the expense of the
new leader instituting a comprehensive policy program. This means that a successor may
be able to undo some policies of the backslider, but will not be able to leverage a recently
constrained government to completely enact a full set of policies.
The alternative to restoration is retaliation, where a successor either uses damaged
institutions or further damages them to both more effectively change policy and to tilt the
electoral playing field in an advantageous way. In practice, retaliators may take advantage of
the weakened executive constraints to pursue their goals more easily, use the control of the
bureaucracy to their benefit, or tilt the electoral playing field to their benefit. Retaliation
can also manifest as symmetrical backsliding actions if the existing institutional alignment
disproportionately benefits the initial backslider’s party (i.e., if the initial backslider packed
courts, then the successor would have to further pack courts or remove judges). Regardless,
retaliation means that the successor aims to use backsliding to pass policies more easily and
manipulate the election infrastructure. This can be achieved by maintaining the recently
worsened status quo or through tit-for-tat actions. For the purpose of this project, I do not
distinguish between these, but they are generally subject to the nature of institutions. For
example, for backsliding that led to advantages in the composition of constitutional courts,
retaliation would require some level of symmetrical backsliding to either add sympathetic
judges or remove adversarial judges. Meanwhile, backsliding that created new executive
powers for a given policy area can likely be similarly leveraged by a successor and would not
require new backsliding to retaliate.
a permanent majority). If a restorative measure helps push back by re-introducing these institutional
constraints, it is not necessarily to limit the majority, but to appropriately limit the exercise of executive
power.
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I incorporate these competing paths (i.e., restore vs. retaliate) in the context of work
(Christenson and Kriner 2017a) that explores a trade-off between the means and ends of
policy change. The means are the governance changes or actions that make policy possible.
The ends are the policy outcomes that result from the means used. I classify backsliding
actions as one of the means to an end that is usually a policy outcome or an advantage in the
electoral sphere. Voters with strong preferences for democratic norms and institutions are
concerned with the means employed, whereas voters who are more focused on policy outcomes
will overlook the means in pursuit of the ends. This produces a trade-off where a change
in the severity of the means (how much backsliding) is positively related to the ends (the
comprehensiveness of the policy enacted). In the long run, parties exchange power; therefore,
the relative policy gain today may not be worth the potentially worse policy enacted by the
other party after a future election. Because of this, I expect this framework to operate in the
short-term, because in the long term, the means and ends will be more balanced out by more
extreme policy outcomes both in favor of and against the voter’s interests. The importance
of the long-term incentives for the successors is explored in depth in Chapter 3.

4.3.1

Means and Ends Preferences of Voters

I distinguish between three ideal types of voters depending on the value they place on the
trade-off described above: ends voters, means voters, and balance voters. In table 4.1, I
summarize schematically the preference of each of these three voters for a successor to replace
an out-party incumbent that engaged in either no backsliding, minor backsliding, or major
backsliding. The first column shows expectations for voter preference when no backsliding has
occurred. This condition is the counterfactual for this study, but is the traditional focus in
the backsliding literature that identifies which voters prefer a backslider without provocation.
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The second two columns show preferences after backsliding has occurred and are the focus of
this paper.
Table 4.1: The Preferred Successor Type for Each of Three Voter Types Given an Incumbent
Action.

Ends voter
Balance voter
Means voter

Incumbent’s Action with
No Backsliding
Initial Backslider (≈ Retaliator)
Status Quo (≈ Restorer)
Status Quo (≈ Restorer)

Respect to Democratic
Minor Backsliding
Retaliator
Restorer or Retaliator
Restorer

Institutions
Major Backsliding
Retaliator
Retaliator
Restorer

Two ideal types of voters — means voters and ends voters — do not respond to the
variation of the incumbent’s action. For means voters, they are concerned about process and
going about policy change in the “correct way.” Therefore, regardless of the actions of the
incumbent, they will always prefer a restorer who will restore democratic institutions, even
at the expense of policy. Ends voters, conversely, always prefer a retaliator because they are
only concerned with policy outcomes and if a preferred outcome requires backsliding, they
will support it. These voters are focused on short-term gains only, even if in the long-run
democratic subversion makes them worse off because of the alternation of parties in office.
These voters are typically important in other work on backsliding because they are a key
coalition that enables backsliders to remain in power since they care less about backsliding
when policy successes are achieved.
Unlike the other two ideal types of voters, balance voters exist on a continuum because
they respond to variation in the severity of backsliding and are generally context-driven.
In the absence of backsliding from the other side, they are skeptical of candidates that
propose engaging in backsliding to achieve policy goals, and instead prefer a candidate more
committed to the status quo (a restorer in this case who has nothing to restore). After severe
and unprecedented backsliding — and I assume also considerable policy change — they prefer
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a retaliator since the means have already been damaged and the policy would be expected
to be more distant from their preferred position. Under a milder version of backsliding,
there is some cutoff where the balance voter would prefer a restorer under that threshold,
and a retaliator above that threshold. The location of this theoretical cut-off occurs on a
continuum where minor agitation can cause retaliator support for some, while others have a
more significant threshold before they support democratic subversion to fight back. For the
purpose of this paper, I consider the policy enacted by the former backslider as given. In
reality, more extreme backsliding can be used to pass more extreme policy, but this is not
always the case. Regardless of the actual policy, I argue that it is the trade-off between policy
and backsliding severity that drives voters’ responses, and the magnitude of the policy and
severity of the backsliding determines the cut-off. To summarize, all three of these groups
of voters are important for the selection of a successor, and determining the path that the
successor takes.
This framework highlights a crucial element of the future of democratic stability: whether
voters treat democracy as being “worth it.” When supporters of would-be backsliders
see democracy as a necessary inconvenience then they will be deterred from engaging in
backsliding. In contrast, when voters prefer their leaders to be unencumbered by rules they
see as unnecessary, the path to democratic collapse is much clearer. Erdoğan once said that
“[d]emocracy is like a tram. You ride it until you arrive at your destination, then you step off”
(Çakır 2012). And more explicitly, “[d]emocracy is a means, not an end”(Çakır 2012)22 . While
elected and non-elected elites are crucial in signaling these paths to voters, sometimes voters
can actively cheer on democratic subversion and push their leaders on this path. Democratic
subversion is normatively bad and there are additional negative outcomes such as lower levels
of personal freedoms, higher inequality, hampered government responsiveness, and lower
22

In Turkish: “Demokrasi bir tramvaydır, gittiğimiz yere kadar gider, orada ineriz” and “Demokrasi amaç
değil araçtır” respectively.
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governmental accountability (Diamond and Morlino 2004). These negative outcomes are
the key reason why we should know how preferences against democracy develop. We can
speak to voters’ role in either contributing to, or working against democratic stability by
understanding their preferences within this trade-off more thoroughly.
This framework provides two important measurments that can help us understand the
preferences of voters and how they decide whether to support a restorer or a retaliator. The first
measurement is the proportion of the different voter types in an electorate. It is unlikely that
the three types are evenly represented, and existing work has been divided about what voters
value at the aggregate. Further, this typology is useful for disaggregating voter preferences
and can help explain different results in the literature that may be direct consequences of
experimental manipulation (i.e., a too severe or not severe enough manipulation). The second
measurement is the location of the means-ends cut-off for the balance voters (above which
they prefer the retaliator and below the restorer). If voters in the aggregate respond similarly
across the three incumbent actions in table 4.1, it would indicate a dearth of balance voters.
However, if there are meaningful aggregate differences in the response to the incumbent’s
actions, then the balance voters are likely driving these differences. Also, depending on
experimental manipulation, we can assess where different kinds of backsliding actions are in
relation to this threshold and provide useful information about the preferences of voters after
backsliding.
To put these concepts in context, I return to the American case to detail some specific
expectations based on the theory and the existing understanding of the party system in
the United States. Constitutional hardball — a concept similar to several retaliatory minor
backsliding actions — has been a key feature in American Politics, both within the executive
branch and the legislature, for much of the last century. Under Franklin D. Roosevelt, efforts
to capture the courts were undertaken to execute a significant policy program in the face of
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the Great Depression. In the 1970s and 1980s, Nixon and Reagan helps spearhead the capture
of the bureaucracy along with other scandals that involved overreach (Watergate and IranContra respectively). In the 1990s, Newt Gingrich initiated a series of constitutional hardball
actions that persists today. Recently, Mitch McConnell has been a significant instigator of
constitutional hardball within the Senate. Outside of the legislature, under each the three
most recent former presidents, executive action and overreach has been undertaken, almost
always controversially and in service of partisan goals, to exercise undue authority in military
conflict, protection for undocumented immigrants, and banning visitors or immigrants from
dubiously selected countries, to name a few. A defining characteristic of this literature is
the asymmetric nature of the execution of hardball and the reliance that Republicans have
taken to create gridlock, pack courts, and aggressively undermine the executive branch when
they do not control it (Fishkin and Pozen 2018; Grumbach 2022; Mann and Ornstein 2016;
Shugerman 2019). For this reason, I expect that Republican respondents are more likely to
prefer retaliators than Democrats regardless of the action of the incumbent.
The cues that voters send their leaders after a backsliding incumbent is removed are
an important component leaders use to determine the path ahead, and can combine with
or contradict the expectations of successor behavior from Chapter 3. If moderation and
restoration are not valued by voters who put politicians into office, then it is unlikely that those
approaches will be enacted by elected leaders. This not only affects the initial backsliders, but
also their successors. In settings like Venezuela where a dysfunctional “partarchy” dominated
from the 1961 constitution to Chavéz’s election in 1998 (Landau 2018), the path from
democratic backsliding to democratic failure was a multi-step process that gradually damaged
norms and institutions until an actor could execute a full authoritarian reversion. This theory
helps isolate a step in that process and provides a window to show how preferences and
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incentives at the voter level can either perpetuate that process or stall the cycle in favor of
democratic restoration.

4.4

Experimental Design

I evaluate this theoretical framework through a survey experiment administered to respondents
in the United States. Since the United States recently removed a backsliding incumbent in
a democratic election, this recent history paired with the longer history of constitutional
hardball makes voters in the United States a useful sample to evaluate the theoretical
framework. The structure for the experiment is summarized in table 4.2. Two iterations of
the experiment were fielded during the month of June 2022.
Table 4.2: Experiment Structure

Pre-Treatment
Treatment
(Random
Assignment
Blocked by
Partisanship)

Post-Treatment

-Collect covariates for respondents including partisanship
-Identify policy area important to respondent (R) for use in experimental
design: a favored and disfavored policy identified (see table 4.3)
-Assess opinions on American democracy
-R given vignette in which the incumbent is from the opposite party
-Policy area identified above is incorporated into this vignette
Incumbent experimental conditions (see figure 4.1) in the vignette:
1. Control: Incumbent did not engage in backsliding:
passed disfavored policy into law using status quo measures
2. Treatment 1: Incumbent engaged in moderate backsliding:
passed disfavored policy into law using executive powers
3. Treatment 2: Incumbent engaged in major backsliding:
passed disfavored policy into law by removing SC justices
-R chooses between two own-party candidates (with same policy)
in a congressional primary except for one distinction (see figure 4.2):
1. A restorer who plans to restore or maintain democracy with
lower probability of favored policy success
2. A retaliator who plans to retaliate or engage in backsliding with
higher probability of favored policy success
-Re-assess opinions on American democracy
-Assess R’s interest in politics

Note: The randomized groups are bolded. The main choice for the respondent is italicized.
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Table 4.3: Policy Proposals Used in Vignettes.
Issue Area
Abortion
Healthcare
Guns
Taxes
Immigration
Climate
Change

Democratic Proposal
Eliminate legal restrictions on
abortion before viability
Create of a public option available
to anyone without private health
insurance
Require background checks and ban
semi-automatic weapons
Raise taxes on corporations and
highest earners
Create a pathway to citizenship for
undocumented immigrants that arrived
as children (also known as dreamers)
Create new taxes on polluting
industries and use revenue to fund
alternative sources of power

Republican Proposal
Institute additional legal restrictions
on abortion
Eliminate the Affordable Care Act
(also known as Obamacare)
Eliminate legal restriction on the
right to bear arms
Reduce high taxes on job creators
Reject asylum seekers and combat
illegal immigration
Make effective use of fossil fuel
resources and eliminate regulations
on businesses

Note: For the issue area that the respondent selects, the disfavored policy is plugged into the incumbent
vignette (see figure 4.1 for example text for a Democratic respondent) and the favored policy is plugged into
the congressional candidate vignettes (see figure 4.2 for example text for a Republican respondent).

In the pre-treatment portion of the experiment, respondents were shown a table of
six issue areas (abortion, guns, healthcare, taxes, immigration, and climate change) with
proposed policies from both Democrats and Republicans within that issue area. Policies
for both Democrats and Republicans are presented in table 4.3. Respondents were asked
to choose one of six issue areas where they think the difference between the two parties
is important. After this decision, the respondents selected which policy is closest to their
preferred policy23 . These policy choices were used in the vignettes respondents evaluated. In
the main vignette, an opposite-party incumbent government passed the disfavored policy or
the policy not selected by the respondent. In the two own-party candidate profiles that the
respondent must choose between, both candidates plan to enact the respondents’ selected
23

These issue areas and policies where taken from the 2020 Democratic Party platform and the 2016/2020
Republican Party platform.
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policy. These policies were used for the purpose of providing the respondent with an example
that employed an issue area that concerned them24 .
Figure 4.1: Incumbent Vignettes for Democratic Respondents
Same for all groups: Suppose that the government is controlled by the Republicans and the
Democrats are in the minority. In the upcoming election, your congressperson, a Republican, is up
for re-election. Since the previous election, the Republicans have passed legislation including a
high profile law to pass DISFAVORED POLICY.
Control 1: (No additional text)
Control 2: This law was made possible by the majority support it received in Congress.
Treatment 1: The passage of this law was made possible by Congress giving the executive
branch controversial new powers. This change was criticized as unconstitutional, and allowed the
Democrats to pass laws that they otherwise could not.
Treatment 2: The passage of this law was made possible by the addition of new justices to the Supreme Court to combat a conservative majority that would have struck down the
legislation. This action was widely condemned as unconstitutional, and allowed the Democrats to
pass laws that they otherwise could not.
Note: Each group receives the first three sentences detailing who is in power and what was accomplished.
DISFAVORED POLICY refers to the policy in the issue area that is the opposite of their preferred choice. For
a Democratic respondent, this would correspond to the Republican proposal column in table 4.3. Treatment
conditions correspond to the three incumbent actions in table 4.1.

In the experiment, respondents were presented with an incumbent government controlled
by the party opposite that of the respondent. The respondent learned that their disfavored
policy in their selected issue area was put into effect by the government. Figure 4.1 contains
the text for each incumbent vignette for a respondent who selected the Democratic party’s
policy proposal. In the control groups, the incumbent administration passed the law either
with unstated means or with majority support. In the first iteration of the experiment, no
statement was made about how the law was passed. In a second iteration, two control groups
24

While some policies were selected at different frequencies for Democrats and Republicans (i.e., a higher
proportion of Republicans selected immigration), the different issue areas were not statistically different from
each other with respect to the dependent variable.
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were included, the first group was the same and the second group contained a statement
that the law was passed with a majority of the Congress. In the first treatment group, the
administration engages in a moderate instance of backsliding where the legislature cedes
powers to the executive so it can implement policies that were not possible through legislation.
In the second treatment group, in a more extreme action, the legislature adds additional
Supreme Court Justices, without whom the policy would not have been possible.
Figure 4.2: Congressional Candidate Vignettes for Republican Respondents
CONTROLS 1 AND 2:
Restorer: Plans to work with a new governing majority of Republicans and following existing
rules in government to reverse Democratic legislation on ISSUE AREA and passing a law to
FAVORED POLICY. Experts believe these goals are not likely to pass into law.
Retaliator: Plans to give a Republican President controversial new powers to delegate lawmaking
on ISSUE AREA to reverse Democratic legislation on ISSUE AREA and passing a law FAVORED
POLICY. Experts criticize the controversial new powers as unconstitutional, but believe these
goals are more likely to pass into law.
TREATMENT 1:
Restorer: Plans to work with a new governing majority of Republicans to remove the new powers
for the President and restore previous government practices damaged by Democrats. Also plans to
reverse Democratic legislation on ISSUE AREA and pass a law in FAVORED POLICY. Experts
praised the plan to restore constitutional lawmaking, but believe these goals are not likely to pass
into law.
Retaliator: Plans to give additional controversial powers to a Republican President to combat
the changes made by Democrats. Also plans to reverse Democratic legislation on ISSUE AREA
and pass a law to FAVORED POLICY. Experts criticize the additional powers as unconstitutional,
but believe these goals are more likely to pass into law.
TREATMENT 2:
Restorer: Plans to work with a new governing majority of Republicans and not significantly alter
the legal framework left by Democrats. Also plans to reverse Democratic legislation on ISSUE
AREA and pass a law to FAVORED POLICY. Experts praised the plan to not retaliate against
Democrats on the Supreme Court, but believe these goals are not likely to pass.
Retaliator: Plans to work with a new governing majority of Republicans and add additional
conservative justices to counteract the justices Democrats confirmed. Also plans to reverse
Democratic legislation on ISSUE AREA and pass a law to FAVORED POLICY. Experts criticize
adding more judges as unconstitutional, but believe these goals are more likely to pass into law.
Note: FAVORED POLICY refers to the policy in the issue area that is the preferred choice of the respondent.
For a Republican respondent, this would correspond to the Republican proposal column in table 4.3. ISSUE
AREA refers to the selected issue area from the Issue Area column in the same table.
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After evaluating the incumbent, the respondent was presented two own-party congressional candidates — a restorer and a retaliator — who could run against their opposite party
congressperson. The only difference between the candidate profiles between groups is the
kind of backsliding of which they are responding. Figure 4.2 contains the text for each pair
of candidates for each of the treatment groups for a respondent who selected a preferred
policy from the Republicans. The restoration candidate plans to either maintain or repair
institutions regardless of the incumbent’s action. The retaliation candidate plans to engage
in backsliding regardless of the previous vignette. In the control group, the retaliator plans
to initiate backsliding (identical to the backsliding in treatment 1) and in the two treatment
groups plans to retaliate by either maintaining new backsliding or engaging in symmetrical
backsliding. The restoration candidate’s policy goals are identical to the retaliator, but are
presented as less likely to pass compared to the retaliator. The respondent is informed that
both candidates are about as likely to win both the primary election and the general election
to deter a strategic voting choice.
The respondents evaluated the two challenger candidates on three questions. The first
is the main dependent variable: a forced choice for which candidate gets the respondent’s
vote. The second and third questions are which candidate they think would be better for the
country, and which they would be more likely to support for higher office. These questions
allowed the respondent to consider the candidates as a whole and determine whether they
see a distinction between them on other subjective measures in addition to the forced choice.
These binary choices, along with minor differences between the vignettes makes estimating
the effect of backsliding on preferences clear.
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4.5

Expectations

The experimental structure above makes the comparison across groups possible in order to
evaluate the theoretical structure. In this section I briefly summarize how the experiment
connects to the theory section and discuss three groups of expectations for the experimental
results.
First, there are two treatment groups to determine whether the severity of backsliding
actions is important for a voter determining whether to support a candidate who prioritizes
democratic restoration after backsliding. The proportion of respondents that select the
restorer in the second treatment group (the more extreme backsliding) provides an estimate
for the proportion of means voters in the sample. Meanwhile, a difference between the
two treatment groups would provide evidence that there is a contingent of balance voter
respondents who weigh the trade-off between policy and backsliding and have some threshold
above which a retaliator is preferred and below which a restorer is preferred. If there is
no difference between the two treatments, it means that voters are either not discerning
backsliding severity, or do not care and intend to retaliate regardless of how the rules were
broken. A future study can be designed to provide a wider array of backsliding actions with
different levels of severity to assess an individual and aggregate cut-off for balance voter
respondents.
Second, the control condition should provide a useful baseline from which to compare
the two experimental conditions. These groups directly correspond to the three columns
for the incumbent actions in table 4.1. The absence of backsliding in the control is useful
for assessing initial support for backsliding without provocation and should allow for the
detection of ends voters who are concerned about policy outputs and not concerned with
the dissolution of democracy. The proportion of respondents that select the retaliator in
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this group then can be compared to the proportions of the two treatments to determine
whether the actions of the incumbent are important in determining the preferred actions
of the successor. If there are meaningful differences in support for retaliators in the two
treatment conditions when compared to the control, this indicates that respondents are
more likely to prefer retaliators when backsliding has occurred and provides evidence for
the presence of balance and means voters. If there is no clear distinction between retaliator
support between the control and treatment groups, it may show that democratic preferences
are not as influential, or the choices are not as comparable as expected. For instance, a
voter choosing between a status quo and initial backsliding candidate without the incumbent
backsliding may not be sufficiently analogous to a choice between a retaliator or restorer after
backsliding.
Lastly, there is reason to expect some heterogeneity depending on the partisan identity
of the respondent. Historically, Republicans have been more associated with democratic
backsliding at the state level (Grumbach 2022) and work on asymmetric constitutional
hardball has asserted Republicans have been more likely to engage in democratic subversion
(Fishkin and Pozen 2018; Shugerman 2019). If elected Republicans are responding to an
electorate that has a higher proportion of ends voters than the populace as a whole, this
may indicate important differences between Democrats and Republicans with respect to
backsliding in practice. A key strength of the design is that I make sure that regardless of
the partisan identification of the respondent, they are always responding to an out-party
incumbent so I can explore two key decisions from past and future American elections. First, I
can simulate both Democratic voters’ preferences in a Democratic primary under a Republican
incumbent backslider such as in 2020, and also current Biden supporters’ preferences for and
against backsliding in the current administration. Additionally, I can simulate the choice of
current Republicans and their preferences for the kinds of candidates they will support in the
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2022 midterm elections and in the 2024 Republican primary for President. If Democrats and
Republicans have similar levels of support for retaliators across the experimental groups, it
would indicate that voters of the two parties do not have dramatically different preferences,
and the differences between the two parties in government (Mann and Ornstein 2016) may
be driven by factors beyond their voters.
Each of these three expectations from the survey experiment will provide novel understanding of how previous backsliding impacts support for or against additional backsliding.
This design, and the results derived from it, can provide additional understanding of the
stability of democratic institutions and the extent to which they can be robust against the
preferences of their own citizens. Candidate selection in these elections will be an important
component in either the way back to, or the continued departure from, democracy and is
a unique strength of this experimental design. If democratic failure is a multi-step process
of retaliatory actions, this survey experiment provides a realistic way to look at the key
decisions in one step of that process.

4.6

Results

For each of the three groups of potential results, evidence for the expected relationships was
only found with respect to the first expectation: voters respond to severity of backsliding by
expressing greater support for a retaliator. For the second expectation, the control group did
not appear to function as intended. Because of this, I re-ran the survey experiment with an
additional control group, but observed similar results. Lastly, with respect to partisanship,
Republicans were not more supportive of retaliators than Democrats. If anything, they were
slightly less likely to support the retaliator. This is would indicate that Republicans’ tendency
to be the more intractable party in government (Mann and Ornstein 2016) is not driven by
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overwhelming preferences of their voters (at least within the confines of this study). I discuss
each of these three groups of expected results and interpret the findings for each of the two
iterations of the experiment: study 1 and study 2.

4.6.1

Study 1

The first survey experiment was fielded on Prolific, a survey platform, between June 16 and
June 19 of 2022. It was distributed to a representative sample of 600.25 The basic results by
treatment group are shown in figure 4.3. In each figure, I include the point estimate which is
the proportion of respondents in a given group that preferred the retaliator. In addition to
the point estimates, I include 95% confidence intervals. I only include results with respect to
the respondent’s choice between the two candidates for the election26 . To assess results with
respect to partisanship, I display results for each treatment group divided by party.
In figure 4.3, I display the basic results by treatment group. Each group was statistically
different from the others, but not in the expected direction with respect to the control group.
In line with expectations, I found that support for the retaliator is dramatically higher in the
second treatment group compared to the first treatment group. This shows that respondents
were more likely to support the retaliator the more extreme the backsliding action. Retaliator
support was 0.434 higher in the treatment 2 than in treatment 1. Results with respect to the
control group were less expected, where more supported the retaliator than in treatment 1
(0.172 higher in the control), but less than in treatment 2 (0.262 lower in the control).
25

Prolific provides a service to acquire a representative sample. While the sample is not balanced by
partisanship, as are most survey platforms, demographic balance of gender, race, and age are in line with
estimates from the 2020 U.S. Census. Around 71% of the respondents selected the Democratic policy as their
preferred policy.
26
Results for which candidate the respondent believed was better for the country and which candidate
they were most likely to support in the future produced similar results. This means that the respondents’
evaluations of the candidates were in line with their main forced-choice, despite one being explicitly less
democratic.
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Figure 4.3: Study 1 Results by Treatment Group (Point Estimates with 95% Confidence
Intervals).
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One reason for the unexpected control group results may be the nature of the vignette.
The control group only outlined that a disfavored law had been passed and no information
was provided regarding its passage. In American politics, there has been a trend of increased
constitutional hardball that has bordered on backsliding (Fishkin and Pozen 2018). In this
case, voters may have presumed some malfeasance worse than the condition in treatment 1.
Additionally, the choice between a retaliator and a restorer in the two treatment groups may
be distinct from the choice between a status quo candidate and a backsliding candidate in
the control. These factors may have led to some of the differences. Regardless, about 43% of
respondents in the control group preferred the backsliding-minded candidate over the status
quo candidate. Within the theoretical structure, and considering that some backsliding may
be implied, I would expect that value represents the ceiling of ends voters in this sample,
but because the level in treatment 1 is lower, the proportion of ends voters may be as well.
Meanwhile, treatment 2 helps assess the proportion of means voters, who select the restorer
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despite severe democratic subversion. Due to these unexpected results with the control group,
I re-ran the survey experiment with an additional control group with an explicit statement
that the law was made possible due to its majority support. I report these results in Study 2.
Figure 4.4: Study 1 Results by Party and Treatment Group.
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The final set of expected results was regarding partisanship. I expected that Republicans
would be more likely to prefer the retaliator, but contrary to this expectation, when aggregating
the results across the treatment groups, Republicans across all groups tended to prefer the
retaliator a statistically significant 0.109 less. In figure 4.4, I disaggregate the results by party
to show how partisanship impacted each of the treatment groups. Within the three groups,
there was only a significant difference in treatment group 227 This may have been driven
by the fact that the vignette about the Supreme Court for Democrats, where Republicans
27

At the p < 0.05 level. The control group had a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.1 level.
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engaged in court packing, was closer to reality than the reverse case for Republicans. I discuss
the importance of these results more in study 2.
Ultimately, I found that more extreme backsliding actions were met by voters with higher
preferences for retaliators. This shows that voters respond to the severity of backsliding and
provides evidence for a significant proportion of balance voters, though the proportion in this
study is difficult to assess because the control group did not function as intended. I re-ran
the survey experiment and included an additional control group to see if these results were
driven by the control group phrasing and if the results were replicable. Lastly, in contrast
with expectations, Republicans supported the retaliator less than Democrats.

4.6.2

Study 2

The second survey experiment was fielded on Prolific, between June 22 and June 24 of 2022
28

. The survey was fielded to a representative sample of 80029 . I re-ran the survey with

an additional control group to see if the results in study 1 were driven by an unintended
implication of backsliding or malfeasance in the control group.
In figure 4.5, I show the by-group results where the results mirror those in study 1. In
this iteration of the survey experiment, the main finding from study 1 — the higher preference
for the retaliator in treatments 2 over treatment 1 — remained significant in study 2. In
this case, support for the retaliator was 0.345 higher in treatment group 2 than in treatment
28
Around 95% of the responses were recorded prior to the release of the Supreme Court’s decision on Dobbs
v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization on the morning of July 23rd. While the issues of abortion and the
Supreme Court were important in the survey design, I do not believe the salience of the decision significantly
impacts these results because of the number of respondents that may have been affected by it was quite
small. 183 respondents selected abortion as their most important issue area (the second most selected issue
after healthcare which was selected by 208) of these, about 70% of respondents preferred the policy from the
Democrats.
29
Similar to Study 1, the results were balanced on gender, age, and race/ethnicity. Around 77% of
respondents in this study selected the Democratic policy as their preferred policy, so this sample is slightly
more liberal than in Study 1.
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Figure 4.5: Study 2 Results by Treatment Group.
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1. This gave additional evidence that voters are more likely to prefer a backsliding-minded
candidate the more backsliding the previous government perpetrated.
This result is noteworthy because it is in direct contrast with the incentives for the
successor in Chapter 3. In the theoretical model from Chapter 3, the more extreme the
backsliding of the initial incumbent, the more a successor should prefer restoration, whereas
in both study 1 and 2, the comparison between treatments 1 and 2 show that voters prefer
retaliation more after severe backsliding. This shows that there is conflict between the
long-term best choice of incoming successors and the more short-term preferences of the
voters who elect them. These competing incentives likely lead to restorers being less preferred
when they actually provide the long-term best option for a voter. The means-ends framework
in this chapter, helps contrast with the long-term approach of Chapter 3 to help detail why
the prospects for restoration may not be so simple.
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Despite the addition of a second control group, results regarding the treatment groups
relative to the control group produced similar results. The first control group (the same
as study 1) was only statistically distinguishable from treatment group 1, where the voters
preferred a retaliator after minor backsliding 0.312 less than when no information was provided.
Meanwhile, control 2, where respondents were informed that the disfavored law passed with
majority support, was statistically distinguishable from both treatment groups, but in the
same direction as study 1. When compared to the second control group, support for the
retaliator was 0.14 higher in the treatment 2 and 0.205 lower in treatment 1. Even though
the control groups did not produce the expected results, the two control groups produced
slightly different results from each other. There was slightly lower support (0.107) for the
retaliator in control 2 than control 1 (though only significant at the p < 0.1 level). This
difference provided some evidence that the initial control group may be capturing more with
respect to bias against the opposite-party incumbent government than initially intended.
These results, paired with the previous iteration, indicate that the control condition is not as
comparable to the treatment groups as expected. Whether those unexpected findings were
driven by built-in assumptions of backsliding or some other factor remains unclear. Future
work can restructure the control group to provide an additional reference point.
Lastly, the the second experiment produced roughly the same results with respect to
partisanship at the aggregate, but different results by group. In figure 4.6, I break down the
study 2 results by partisanship. Republicans, when aggregating across all groups, preferred
the retaliator about 0.08 less, and this was a significant difference aggregated across all
groups. Similar to how the results within treatment 2 in study 1 drove results, this result
seems to be driven by the difference in treatment 1. While the result across all groups was
the same in both studies, in control groups, Republicans and Democrats were statistically
undistinguishable, and there are no consistent results for either treatment groups across the
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Figure 4.6: Study 2 Results by Party and Treatment Group
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two studies. Lastly, because the sample was not balanced by partisanship, a greater number
of Republican respondents may impact the results. Future work can further explore the role
of partisanship, but in this inquiry, the results are mixed and sometimes in the unexpected
direction.

4.7

Implications

Combining the results from both iterations of the survey experiment, one of the expectations
outlined in section 4.5 was supported while the others produced unexpected results. I
discuss the results relative to the expectations and the implications of these findings for the
understanding of voters’ democratic preferences.
First, when comparing the two treatment groups, the level of backsliding perpetrated
by an initial backslider is an important factor for voters to determine whether to support a
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restorer or a retaliator. In line with expectations, when backsliding actions are more extreme,
voters are less likely to be focused on the means (democratic governance) and more focused
on policy results that a retaliator provides. This finding is in contrast to the incentives
for the successor to a backsliding incumbent from Chapter 3, where the more extreme the
backsliding, the more appealing it is to restore institutions. With respect to voters, the
long-term prospects for policy and democracy may not be as important. When voters care
most about policy and retaliation, the prospects for democracy are the most fragile, especially
when choosing a successor to an already effective backslider. This dynamic is an important
implication of both Chapters 3 and 4 and provides expectations for the persistence of a cycle
of retaliatory backsliding.
Second, results comparing the control groups to the treatment groups were unexpected.
Retaliator support in the control conditions fell between the two treatment conditions instead
of being the expected baseline from which retaliator support would increase. This could be
driven by the fact that the two candidates in the control were not as comparable to those in
the treatment conditions. The matchup between an initial backslider versus a status quo
candidate in the control groups, and a retaliator versus a restorer in the treatment groups
may be too distinct from each other to cleanly compare. Additionally, respondents may have
inferred unsavory behavior in the absence of more information of how their disfavored policy
was passed. Given the proliferation of constitutional hardball in recent years, it may be
difficult for respondents to imagine the opposite party behaving with the utmost deference
to norms and institutions. The slight difference between the two control groups in study 2
provided some very modest support that this may be a factor at play, but was not enough
to produce the anticipated results. In the future, establishing a more appropriate control is
an important area to extend and replicate this research. Lastly, treatment group 1 may not
have adequately represented backsliding to voters if they believed the provision of additional
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powers by congress was legitimate (Christenson and Kriner 2017b). Some other example of
executive overreach may have provided more expected results. Regardless, the control groups
relative to treatment 2 produced the expected results.
Third and finally, with respect to openness to backsliding actions, Republican politicians
in the real world and Republican respondents from these studies were less aligned than
anticipated
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. This unexpected difference could be the result of current events influencing

Democrats and Republicans and impacting the way respondents interpreted the vignettes.
Democrats currently have unified control of government, so Republicans may prefer retaliation
less because they know their leaders cannot currently leverage executive overreach. That
said, the experiment simulates a response to an opposite party administration, with which
Republicans can relate. I believe the current “moment” in American politics, where Democrats
are focused on responding to the Trump administration and Republicans look to future
elections and their response to the Biden Administration, helps provide some internal
validity to these choices, so this explanation is less convincing. However, built in advantages
for Republicans in backsliding already enacted may make the vignettes for Democratic
respondents activate real-life preferences more than for Republicans, especially when such
actions, like gerrymandering, have gone unpunished. These issues are a consequence of survey
experimental research in general, and there may eventually be important real-world cases to
design a study around that produce results with greater external validity. For the purpose of
this inquiry, the design was an important first step in evaluating the important decision to
retaliate or restore institutions.
While some of the expectations of this project were not observed in the data, the research
has important implications for the prospects of democratic resurgence. In a setting where a
30

Disaggregating these preferences further may show a distinction between different kinds of Republicans.
Such as strong Trump supporters and more weaker supporters, or another important dimension like evangelical
identification.
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backsliding incumbent was removed in a democratic election, the more severe the backsliding
incumbent, the more opposite-party voters prefer a candidate that retaliates more over a
candidate who tries to improve democratic quality and reduce tension. This preference is in
line with the concept of retaliatory hardball. This result is driven by how voters weight their
policy preferences relative to their democratic preferences: the means and ends trade-off.
Under more modest transgressions, democratic resurgence may be more possible than in the
wake of considerable democratic subversion. This provides a grim picture for countries like
Hungary, Poland, and Turkey which are tightly controlled by backsliders who levied multiple
significant backsliding actions.
Future work can consider the different kinds of democratic backsliding featured in
Chapters 2 and 3, where I expect actions targeting electoral institutions would be especially
alarming to voters. For the sake of simplicity in this chapter, I focused on executive
aggrandizement, but the strategic manipulation of elections may produce more extreme
results. Further, alternative settings, such as the subnational level, where Grumbach’s
“laboratories against democracy” are most prolific may be useful settings to assess voter
preferences. Lastly, in the comparative context, other countries with significantly different
institutions may produce different results driven by institutional structure or the nature of
partisanship and polarization. In a setting like Turkey, where polarization exists more on
a secular-Islamism dimension as opposed to a left-right distinction, important differences
may arise. There is considerable work that still needs to be done to help refine theoretical
expectations.
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4.8

Conclusion

When backsliding incumbents are eventually removed, the preferences of the successors and
their voters will be important to determine the prospects for democratic resurgence, or further
decline. The work in this chapter, combined with the theoretical work in Chapter 3 provided
some useful, albeit competing results regarding the preferences for restoration or retaliation.
I argued, in coordination with existing work, that voters consider a trade-off between
the means employed and the ends realized when supporting a backsliding-minded politician.
I built on this work by looking at the vote choice of out-party voters and the potential way
back to democratic governance after backsliding. I also detailed a typology of voters and
the level of their value on democratic governance or policy goals in leading to their choice
to support retaliatory or restoration-minded politicians. Using this theoretical structure, I
executed a survey experiment in the United States to evaluate the expectations derived from
the theory.
The results from two iterations of this survey experiment showed that voters more
strongly value a retaliator when the initial backslider enacts more extreme backsliding
measures. Results relative to a situation where the incumbent did not backslide provided mixed
results, but interesting points of departure for future research. Additionally, expectations
that Republicans would be more likely to support retaliators were not found. If anything,
Republicans supported restorers more. Re-running this experiment after the election of a
unified Republican government may provide interesting complimentary results.
This research helped us learn how preferences for democratic institutions and norms
may be situational depending on the actions of the previous government, and how this
context impacts democratic stability. By evaluating this theory empirically in a setting where
134

backsliding has yielded to an opposition party, I was able to shed light on how we should
expect democracy to rebound or stagnate after backsliding. The prospect for democracy after
democratic backsliding is highly contingent on the preference of voters. If after backsliding,
voters want their leaders to engage in a tit-for-tat approach where democracy continues to be
eroded and likely eventually degrade completely, then the likelihood of positive developments
in states recently exiting backsliding regimes like the United States is not high. This is
extended to the longer term prospects in countries like Poland, Hungary, and Turkey with
current legacies of backsliding and many more countries that have experienced democratic
recession in recent years.
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